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INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the Italian Constitutional Court reviewed a law that
closed hearings in tax evasion cases to the public. The Court's
opinion began like any other. It surveyed the long tradition of public
hearings in Italy, discussed the drafting history of the constitutional
provisions dealing with procedural safeguards, and weighed the
competing demands of taxpayer privacy and government
transparency. The Court came down definitively on the side of
openness in the courts, endorsing the view that "the public nature of
hearings was implicitly prescribed by the constitutional system."' The
Court declared the law unconstitutional.
Then the opinion took a twist quite foreign to American courts.
The Court let the closed-hearing law stand. According to the Court,
doubts had persisted at the time of the law's enactment whether tax
tribunals were mere "administrative tribunals" rather than real
"courts" deserving the full panoply of procedural safeguards.
Accordingly, the Italian Parliament's failure to provide for public
hearings was excusable. Now that the Constitutional Court had
clarified that tax tribunals were courts and that public hearings were
constitutionally required, however, it had become "absolutely
indispensable, in order to avoid grave consequences, that the
legislature quickly intervene to bring tax proceedings into
conformity" with the Italian Constitution.2
And so, pending
the law.3
down
strike
to
declined
Court
the
action,
legislative
In recent years, the Italian Constitutional Court has often
chosen this same model of decision making, following the pattern of
denounce-decline-demand: It denounces a law for conflicting with the
Constitution, but then declines to annul it, instead demanding that the
legislature reform the law itself. For example, the Court has found
constitutional defects in laws that failed to provide favorable parole
conditions for juveniles, 4 to ensure the independence of military

I Sent. 212/1986, 31 Giur. Cost. 1637, 1640 (1986).

All translations in this

Article are by the author.
2 Id. at 1642.

3 See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text for a
discussion of subsequent
events.
4 SeeSent. 125/1992, 37 Giur. Cost. 1072, 1081 (1992).
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tribunals,' and to tax workers equally to support the national healthcare system. 6 In each case, the Court began its opinion by excoriating
the law for failing to live up to constitutional principles. Yet, instead
of nullifying the statute, the Court called upon Parliament to fix the
law. Lurking behind each decision was a threat, sometimes veiled,
sometimes quite explicit, that the Court's patience would have its
limits, and that protracted legislative inaction would leave it no
choice but to invalidate or modify the law in a future case.
Sometimes, but not always, the Court followed up on its threat. For
convenience, I will refer to these decisions as "informal declarations
of unconstitutionality."
This kind of decision did not, like Athena, spring fully formed
from the brows of the constitutional judges. The Court's decisions
informally announcing that a law is unconstitutional are simply the
latest stage in its ongoing effort to fine-tune, rather than dismantle,
the legal system. Part I of this Article begins by reviewing how the
Constitutional Court, when it opened for business in 1956, had a
single choice: It could declare a statute unconstitutional and thereby
nullify it, or decline to do so.
Over the last forty years, the Court has developed more refined
tools for operating on constitutionally problematic laws, so that it
need not always amputate them from the body of the legal system.
First, the Court began to interpret statutes in ways that avoided
constitutional problems. Next, it limited itself to striking down
particular applications of a law, thereby salvaging as much of the
Then, the Court began to add "missing"
statute as possible.
that otherwise would have been
provisions to statutes
unconstitutional. In exceptional cases, it even let some laws slip by as
"temporarily" constitutional, often on the ground that they were
justifiable short-term responses to a national crisis. Put in American
terms, the Italian Constitutional Court has engaged in a sort of
judicial self-restraint. It has assiduously cultivated what Alexander
Bickel called the "passive virtues" by refraining from adjudicating
constitutional challenges when possible, and limiting the effects of its
judgments when it does act.7 Yet this "passivity" in the sense of not

5 SeeSent. 67/1984, 29 Giur. Cost. 419 (1984).
6 See infra notes 50, 104-107 and accompanying
text.
7 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:

THE SUPREME COURT

AT THE BAR OF POLrlMCS 111-98 (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANcH]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
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striking down laws has been made possible only by the Court's
"activism" in creatively interpreting them.
The Court has been driven to this "passive activism" mainly by a
desire to husband its limited reservoir of legitimacy, which it draws
upon whenever it nullifies a democratically enacted law. Several
factors have left the Court unsatisfied with its usual array of
techniques to soften the blow of a declaration of unconstitutionality:
Parliament8 perennially fails to respond to the Court's invalidation of
defective laws (which leaves a gap in the legal system), the laws the
Court is asked to strike down often involve the award of far-reaching
social and economic benefits (which. makes it legally problematic to
create a gap in light of the social guarantees embodied in the
Constitution), and these laws are more often recently enacted (which
places the Court in the difficult situation of invalidating a recent
expression of the majority's will). When reviewing a modem law that
imperfectly vindicates so-called "affirmative" social welfare rights, or
that distributes government benefits unevenly, the Court has tried to
avoid striking down the law entirely, because that would leave the
rights completely unprotected and repudiate a recent choice of the
legislature. Nor can the Court effectively revise the law because that
would exceed what it perceives to be its properjudicial function.
Part I discusses how the Court has tried to resolve these
shortcomings in its techniques of "passive activism" by resorting to
informal declarations of unconstitutionality. By planting a foot on
either side of the constitutional fence, the Italian Constitutional
Court does not "uphold" the challenged law. It does not issue the law
a certificate of constitutional good health. Instead, the Court
explicitly points out the constitutional defect in the law and thereby
tries to prod the legislature to reform the legislation. The Court
warns Parliament that if reform is not forthcoming within a
reasonable amount of time, it will act more forcefully in a subsequent
case, usually by striking down the entire law. The Court's practice,
however, leaves much room for improvement. By leaving litigants in
early cases subject to an unconstitutional law, it sacrifices individual
justice. Moreover, the Court undercuts its own efforts to spark
legislative reform by failing to set strict deadlines or to follow up its
decisions by later striking down the unconstitutional laws. Just as

Throughout this paper, references to Parliament are meant to include the two
houses of the legislature, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, as well as the
Government (that is, the Council of Ministers), which is responsible to the two
chambers and bears the primary responsibility for legislative initiative.
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"passive activism" has its shortcomings, so too do informal
declarations of unconstitutionality.
Part II examines how American courts might learn from the
Italian example. This section begins by tracing how courts can give
Congress time to fix an unconstitutional statute using traditional
legal tools: declaratory judgments, equitable discretion to delay
injunctive relief, and the retention of jurisdiction to monitor
compliance with judgments. Part II then explores the types of cases
in which delay may be desirable. Most of the time, American courts
will have less reason to delay than will their Italian counterparts,
partly because American courts have greater ability to interpret
statutes to avoid constitutional adjudication, and partly because there
are fewer objections in American law to leaving a "gap" in the wake of
striking down a statute. Supreme Court precedent, however, suggests
that, in certain circumstances, an Italian-style breathing space may be
well-suited to our American legal system. This may be particularly
true when nullifying a law would greatly disrupt public administration
or when drawing up creative relief would require judges to seriously
reallocate public spending. Properly administered, American courts
can avoid the problems reflected in current Italian practice, that is,
the lack of individualized justice and of credible threats. Finally, I
discuss enforcement of the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment
to the United States Constitution to illustrate how American courts
could decide to delay the exercise of their injunctive power.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ITALY
A. The Origins & Structure of the Italian ConstitutionalCourt
In order to understand how the Italian Constitutional Court
works, it is important to realize how its place in the Italian judiciary
differs from that of the United States Supreme Court in the American
judicial system. In particular, it is worth noting how the numerous
powers accorded to American federal courts, including the Supreme
Court (e.g., interpretation of federal statutes and the Constitution,
review over lawsuits against public officials, and review of the
constitutionality of legislation) are divided among several Italian
tribunals, each supreme within its own sphere.
The Court of
Cassation sits atop the hierarchy of ordinary courts, with the final
word on statutory interpretation. 9 The Council of State heads a
9

See MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM:

80-81 (1967).
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separate network of administrative courts charged with supervising
the far-reaching bureaucracy and web of state-owned businesses in
Italy. 10 The Court of Accounts has authority over state budgetary
matters." Finally, the Superior Council of Magistrature is responsible
for the internal governance of the judicial branch.1
The Constitutional Court is a newcomer to Italy's legal system,
having decided its first case only in 1956. The post-war Constitution
was quite innovative in introducing judicial review of legislation to
Italy, and the Constitution concentrated this power in a single body,
the Constitutional Court. The Court generally is viewed as an organ
quite separate from the rest of the judiciary, in part because the
Court exercises the more "political" function of reviewing the validity
of legislative acts. Unlike the United States Constitution, which vests
"the judicial Power" in the Supreme Court,13 the Italian Constitution
sets the groundwork for the Constitutional Court in articles separate
from that of the 'judiciary."" Yet, like the rest of the courts, the
Constitutional Court is expected to stand above the fray of partisan
politics. The Court is headquartered atop the Quirinal Hill in Rome,
across the street from the President of the Republic, who, according
to the Constitution, "represents national unity."' 5 As with the
President, the Court is expected to serve as a special guarantor of the
Constitution.
The Constitutional Court's most important duty is to rule on the
compatibility of any national or regional law with the Italian
Constitution. 6 The bulk of its workload arrives from lower courts,
10 See id. at 81-84.

1

See generally FRANcEsco

DI RENZO,

LA CORTE DEI CONTI:

STRuTrURA E

(1978).
See Alessandro Pizzorusso, Italian and American Models of the Judiciary and of

ArrRIBUZIONI
12

JudicialReview of Legislation: A Comparison of Recent Tendencies, 38 AM. J. COMp. L. 373,
375-77 (1990) (addressing recent developments in Superior Council of
Magistrature).
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.").
14 See CosTrruzioNE [Constitution] [CosT.] (Italy) art. 101-13, 134-37.
The
Constitutional Court is governed by Articles 134-37 of the Italian Constitution,
grouped under the rubric of "Constitutional Guarantees." The other courts draw
their authority from Articles 101-13, headed "The Magistrature." The Court is
composed of fifteen judges serving nine-year nonrenewable terms, drawn from
among judges, law professors, and lawyers with at least twenty years of experience.
Five judges are nominated by the President of the Republic, five by Parliament, and
five by the careerjudiciary. See CosT. art. 135.
15 CosT. art. 87,
cl. 1.
16

See CosT. art. 134. Additionally, the Court is charged with resolving conflicts
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which must certify constitutional questions on an interlocutory basis
as they arise in pending cases.' As long as the Constitutional Court
agrees that the challenge is relevant to the litigation and not
manifestly groundless, it is obliged to rule on the constitutionality of
the impugned law.' The Court assesses the constitutionality of the
challenged law in the abstract, not simply as applied to the parties
before the Court. In other words, the Constitutional Court reviews
laws; it does not decide cases. This distinction is important, because
it means that the Court itself cannot tailor a remedy to fit only the
parties before it. That is ajob for the lower court on remand. This
centralized system stands in obvious contrast with the American
system of diffuse constitutional review, in which both trial and
over the distribution of powers within and among the central and regional
governments, adjudicating charges against the President of the Republic, and preclearing referendum questions. See id.
1
See Law of March 11, 1953, n.87, art. 23, GAZZETrA UFFICIALE, Mar. 14,
1953, at
984, 986. All proceedings are stayed pending the Constitutional Court's review of
the certified question. This midstream review of constitutional issues, in conjunction
with pending lawsuits, is known in Italian as "in via incidentale." In certain
circumstances, the national or regional governments can also invoke the Court's
original jurisdiction to review a statute outside the litigation context, or "in via
principale" See Law of March 11, 1953, n.87, art. 31-35, GAZzETrA UmFcI., Mar. 14,
1953, at 984, 986-87. In 1996, the Court's caseload was divided roughly as follows:
95% certified questions; 3% original jurisdiction; 2% conflict of powers. See Renato
Granata, La Giustizia costituzionale nel 1996, 42 Giur. Cost. 1239, 1318 (1997) (press
conference of President of Constitutional Court) (referring to cases disposed of in
1996).
18
See Constitutional Law of 1948, n.1; Law of March 11, 1953, n.87, art. 23,
GAZZETTA UmcIALE, Mar. 14, 1953, at 984, 986; GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, LA GiusIzIA
COSTrrUZIONALE 192-98 (relevance), 202-03 (not manifestly unfounded) (new ed.
1988); see generally Elisabetta Catelani, La "Questione di legittimit'i costituzionale" nel
processo incidentale: La Sua determinazione nella piii recente giurisprudenza della Corti, 32
Giur. Cost. 1831 (1987) (discussing standards for finding question relevant and not
manifestly unfounded). Under the rubric of relevance, the Court has developed
rules on ripeness and similar doctrines that allow it to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions. See ZAGREBELSKY, supra, at 198-201 (discussing cases in which Court
refused to adjudicate questions that were hypothetical, unripe, or in which a decision
striking down a law would not have any concrete effect on the pending case). The
Italian phrase "not manifestly unfounded" corresponds roughly to the American
concept of "colorable."
A lower court's decision not to refer a constitutional question to the
Constitutional Court is unreviewable. During the Court's early years, the upper
echelons of the judiciary were reluctant to submit many questions to the
constitutional tribunal. This reluctance has sometimes been attributed to the
established judiciary's discomfort with the new constitutional organ, as well as to the
fact that the personnel of the judiciary had not been purged of fascist elements after
World War II. It is interesting to note that many of the Court's earliest important
decisions arose in cases referred by low-level, local judges, who were often appointed
after the formation of the new republic. See CAPPELETr, supra note 9, at 77-78 &
n.134.
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appellate courts must rule on constitutional issues as they arise. Only
as a last resort does the United States Supreme Court address
constitutional questions, and it enjoys broad discretion under its
certiorari jurisdiction to avoid most of them.' 9
With respect to judicial review, the Constituent Assembly that
drew up the Italian Constitution in 1948 provided the Constitutional
Court with a single power: to nullify unconstitutional laws. Article
136 of the Italian Constitution reads: "When the Court declares the
constitutional illegitimacy of a norm of a law or of an act having the
force of law, the norm ceases to be effective on the day after the
publication of the decision. '0 In short, the Constitutional Court has
,9See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (certiorari from federal courts of appeals); 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1996) (certiorari from state supreme courts); SuP. CTr. R. 10
(Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari). In theory, a court of
appeals is permitted to certify a question of law to the Supreme Court before issuing
its own ruling. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (1994). Invocation
of this authority, however, is exceedingly rare. See SuP. CT. R. 11 (requiring that case
be of "imperative public importance" for issuance of writ of certiorari before
judgment); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (involving
Supreme Court acceptance of review before judgment to adjudicate the validity of
President's suspension of United States citizens' claims against Iran, when resolution
of the issue will determine the validity of intergovernmental agreement for release of
American hostages).
20 COST. art. 136.
The Italian Parliament recently debated a constitutional
amendment that would have permitted the Constitutional Court to defer the date on
which an unconstitutional law becomes ineffective, up to one year. The text of the
proposed constitutional reforms can be found in Progetto di legge costituzionale,
Revisione della parte seconda della Costituzione, Testo risultante dalla pronuncia della
Commissione sugli emendamenti presentati ai sensi del comma 5 dell'articolo 2 della legge
costituzionale
24
gennaio
1997,
n.
1,
<http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/relass7.htm>
(visited Aug.
21, 1998) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]; see also Servizio Studi della Camera dei
deputati, Dossier No. 8, Ilprogetto di revisione della Parte seconda della Costituzione (Atto
della Camera 3931-A e Atto del Senato 2583-A), <http://www.camera.it/parlam/
bicam/rifcost/dossier/aindice.htm> (visited Aug. 21, 1998) (summarizing and
explaining proposed reforms). Unrelated political developments seem to have
doomed these proposed reforms for the foreseeable future. See James Blitz, Italy's
Efforts to Reform End in Failureand Recriminations, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), June 4, 1998,
at 2.
In several cases, the Italian Court has circumvented the requirement that a law
lose effect the day after judgment, simply by delaying publication of its decision until
Parliament passed legislation to supplant the unconstitutional statute. For example,
the Court delayed the deposit of its judgment in Sent. 64/1970, 15 Giur. Cost. 663
(1970), thus surreptitiously achieving the same results as the Austrian Constitutional
Court, which is entitled to defer the effect of its decisions. See Carlo Colapietro, Le
pronunce "erogatorie" della Corte costituzionale ed il vincolo costituzionale della copertura
finanziaria: le "additivedi prestazione" sono per loro naturaesenti dai vincoli e limiti dell'art.
81 Cost., 141 Giur. It. (PART I) 1249, 1257 (1989); Vincenzo Vigoriti, Italy: The
ConstitutionalCourt, 20 AM.J. COMP. L. 404, 410 & nn.28-29 (1972). In that case, the
President of the Court had informal contacts with the executive branch so that the
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9

the power of "negative legislation." The Court can wipe off the books
any law that conflicts with the Constitution. These decisions are
known as sentenze di accoglimento, or judgments that "accept" a
constitutional challenge. Only these judgments that strike down a
law are technically binding because Article 136 of the Italian
Constitution provides only for declarations of unconstitutionality.Once
the Constitutional Court issues its decision, proceedings resume in
the lower court. If the Court has struck down the law, the ordinary
judge must proceed to decide the case without reference to the
nullified law. The Constitutional Court has no power to review how
its decisions are implemented in particular cases.21
When the Constitutional Court declines to strike down a law, by
contrast, its decision lacks formal binding authority because neither
the Italian Constitution nor the implementing legislation makes any
22 Technically, then, the
mention of declarations of constitutionality.
Court never actually upholds a law; it merely declines to invalidate

government had enough time to prepare a decree in response to the Court's
invalidation of portions of a pretrial detention law. See ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 18, at
307. Similarly, in 1977, the Court delayed ruling on a challenge to a property tax
until Parliament had amended the statute. Once the new law was passed, the Court
remanded the question to the lower court, to re-evaluate the "relevance" of the
constitutional challenge. See id. In these cases, the Court apparently coordinated its
action with the political branches to avoid creating a statutory vacuum that might
cause public confusion.
Nevertheless, surreptitious delay, even if tolerable on rare occasions, is
unacceptable as a general rule. Aside from violating the literal strictures of Article
136, such direct coordination between the Court and the political branches raises
important structural issues. First, such coordination raises the question of whether
the Court might allow partisan political considerations to determine the timing of its
decisions. Furthermore, by denying the litigants any chance to rebut secret
arguments put forward by the legislature, behind-the-scenes negotiations violate
widely accepted notions of procedural fairness to the litigants. Additionally, even if
such negotiation did not create an excessive risk of mixing judicial considerations
with extraneous motives, there is still the problem that informal discussion with the
political branches will not always lead to a solution. The Italian Parliament already
suffers from extraordinary inertia and has been unresponsive to judicial requests to
reform unconstitutional statutes. The Parliament's poor track record indicates that
it would be just as unable to respond in a prompt or uniform manner to covert
requests for cooperation with the judiciary.
21 See Giovanni Cassandro, The Constitutional Court of Italy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5-7
(1959).
See Lwvo PALADIN, DiRrlro COSTITUZIONALE 771-72 (1991)

(noting that, while

these judgments provide useful guidance to ordinary judges, they are not considered
binding precedents). For a glimpse at the minority view that these decisions should
have binding precedential effect, see ROBERTO PINARDI, LA CORTE, I GIUDICI ED IL
LEGISLATORE:
IL
PROBLEMA DEGLI
EFFETTI TEMPORALI
DELLE SENTENZE
D'INCOSTITUZIONAUTA 89-90 n.50 (1993).
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it.25 These judgments refusing to annul a statute, known as sentenze di

rigetto because they "reject" a challenge to a law, have only one formal
consequence: The judge who certified the constitutional question
must apply the challenged law in the pending litigation. Beyond that,
the decision has only persuasive force, insofar as it indicates how the
Court is likely to rule on a similar challenge in a future case."
This distinction between binding and nonbinding decisions is
quite meaningful in practice because lower courts may ask the
Constitutional Court to review a law that it has already declined to
For example, consider the Italian statute that
strike down.
criminalized blasphemy against the "State religion," that is,
Catholicism.2 In a 1973 case, the Court turned away a challenge to
that law based on the principle of equality, concluding that the
legislature was entitled to take into consideration the religious
affiliation of a majority of the Italian population. 6 Because this
decision was not binding precedent, however, lower courts were able
to continue challenging the blasphemy law in later cases.
Accordingly, in 1988, a similar question was referred to the Court. It
again rejected the argument that the law was unconstitutional, but
noted that recent official recognition of other religions had undercut
the rationale for singling out blasphemy against Catholicism as a
crime. 27 Reconsidering the issue in 1995 when yet another lower
court certified the question for review, the Court finally decided that
The Court rested its
the blasphemy law was unconstitutional.
decision on the equality provision of the Constitution, reasoning that
blasphemy must be forbidden either as to all religions, or as to none.
28 At this point, the Court's judgment was final and binding, and it
nullified the blasphemy law. As will be seen later, this ability to repropose questions to the Constitutional Court is key to its strategy of
informal declarations of unconstitutionality.2
See Cassandro, supra note 21, at 6.
See id.
25 See CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 724 (Italy) (punishing "outrageous invective or
speech, against the Divinity or the Symbols or the Persons venerated in the State
reliAion").
See Sent. 14/1973, 18 Giur. Cost. 69 (1973).
27 See Sent. 925/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 4294 (1988).
28 See Sent. 440/1995, 40 Giur. Cost. 3475
(1995).
See infra note 101 and accompanying text. Interestingly, this allows the
Constitutional Court to overrule only prior decisions that found a law constitutional.
The Constitutional Court cannot, by contrast, revive a law that it previously found
unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court is not subject to such a
restriction. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (overruling prior
decision that had declared unconstitutional a program allowing public school
25
24
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The drafters of the Italian Constitution thought the power of
negative legislation would give the nascent Constitutional Court all
the tools it needed to fulfill its most important task: to guard against
laws that curtailed civil and political rights. Memories of the fascist
era and its clampdowns on political dissent were still fresh. The
drafters believed that the Court, as the guardian of individual liberty,
needed only the power to strike down oppressive laws. One speaker
at the time of the Constituent Assembly described the proposed
Court simply as an institutionalization of the popular right of
resistance against tyranny, of civil disobedience of unjust laws.30 By
erasing those unjust laws, the theory held, the Court could restore
liberty and put the constitutional house back in order.
Even so, the Constituent Assembly was wary of giving unelected
judges too much power, and it purposely limited the Constitutional
Court to the power of negative legislation. An enduring Rousseauan
strand persisted in Italian political thought, according to which a
popularly elected legislature embodies the supreme expression of the
general will. In pre-fascist Italy, Parliament answered to no one but
the electorate and could amend the Constitution by majority vote.-"
The rare call for a rigid constitution and judicial review fell on deaf
ears.32 Only after World War II, when the new Italian Republic was
formed, was a new, difficult-to-amend constitution adopted. Some of
the old attitudes persisted, however, and Parliament was elected
according to one of the purest forms of proportional representation

teachers to offer instruction in parochial school classrooms).
The Constitutional Court routinely turns away renewed challenges to statutes
that it has already upheld, issuing summary orders describing the challenges as
"manifestly unfounded." See e.g., ord. 378/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 1687 (1988)
(declaring "manifestly unfounded" a challenge to a statute precluding public
hearings before tax court); ord. 431/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 1962 (1988) (turning away
a challenge to health tax).

50See

GIUSTINO D'ORAzIo, LA GENESI DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE 97-99, 117

(1981). D'Orazio reviews the partisan debates over the Constitutional Court before,
during, and immediately after the Constituent Assembly. See also Lucio PEGORARO,
LA CORTE E IL PARLAMENTO:
SENTENZE-INDIRIZZO E ATIVITA LEGISLATIVA 5-6 (1987)
(discussing how the Court was designed as guarantor of individual liberty).
31 See CAPPELLETri, supra note 9, at 76. Indeed, at times it appears that the
executive answered to no one but itself. See DENIS MACK SMITH, MODERN ITALY: A
PoLITIcAL HISTORY 260-67 (1997) (relating how the king and a handful of cabinet
ministers brought Italy into World War I against the wishes of a parliamentary
maiority).
See D'ORAzio, supra note 30, at 28-32 (discussing failed proposals for judicial
review in 1925-1926, prompted by the government's increasing resort to legislation
by executive decree).
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A distinct skepticism of countermajoritarian forces

accompanied this preference for direct democratic representation.
Even though the postwar period saw firm support for some kind
of constitutional tribunal, the Constituent Assembly was never
comfortable with the notion that fifteen lawyers should be able to
A
invalidate the acts of the people's elected representatives.
itself
transform
frequently voiced concern was that the Court might
into a "political organ, in a sense a supervisor of every activity of the
state authorities, which, far from keeping itself impartial, would not
be able to keep free from the influence of the parties and the
Indeed, many Italian jurists were keenly
interplay of interests.3 3
aware of the obstacles that the United States Supreme Court had
thrown up to President Roosevelt's New Deal.34 These jurists feared
that the American brand of 'judicial activism" might take root in
Italy. Judges with too much power might be tempted to interfere in
decisions that belonged to the political, rather than the legal, sphere.
One way to limit the reach of such judicial activism was to cabin the
Court's range of freedom, by limiting its jurisdiction to the
nullification of laws that conflicted with the Constitution.
Interestingly, there was debate at the Italian Constituent
Assembly regarding whether the Constitutional Court should possess
a power like that of the Austrian constitutional tribunal, which can
delay implementation of its decisions for up to a year in order to give
the legislature time to pass corrective legislation.3 5 The drafters of the
and withheld such
Italian Constitution rejected this plan, however,
3 6
Court.
Constitutional
their
from
flexibility
35 Id. at 89 (quoting speech by Professor G. Astuti before 1946 Congress
of the
Italian Liberal Party). These concerns about political influence intensified when the
time came to nominate the first judges to the Constitutional Court. The Christian
Democratic-led government proposed that the five judges nominated by Parliament
should be chosen by simple majority vote, and that the five judges nominated by the
President of the Republic should be proposed by the minister ofjustice - raising the
possibility that the governing party would control appointment of two-thirds of the
Court. Both proposals were ultimately defeated: Parliament chooses judges by threefifths vote, effectively requiring the consensus of opposition parties, and the
President has a free hand in choosing his nominees. Yet, further disputes over the

appointment process delayed the Court's inauguration until 1956, fully eight years
after the new Constitution had come into force. See ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 18, at

488-93.
34

See D'ORAZio, supa note 30, at 32, 180-81.
[Constitution] [B-VG] (Austria), art. 139, para. 5,

35 BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ

cited in ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 18, at 308, n.107.
It is worth noting that a parliamentary commission recently re-opened that
debate, recommending a constitutional amendment that would give the
Constitutional Court precisely such a power to postpone the efficacy of its judgments.
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During its early years, the power of negative legislation largely
sufficed for the Constitutional Court to accomplish the main task it
had set for itself, namely, to clear away restrictive laws from the prerepublican (and especially fascist) period that conflicted with the new
Constitution. This task was problematic particularly because both the
national civil and criminal codes had been promulgated under
fascism, and the new legislature never undertook a comprehensive
revision of the legal codes after World War I1.37 It was not by chance
that the first decision of the Constitutional Court signaled its
determination to confront those old laws head-on, by asserting its
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws enacted before the
promulgation of the 1948 Constitution.38 Representative of these
early decisions was the Court's invalidation of laws from the 1930s
and 1940s that authorized special security commissions to label
particular citizens "dangerous" and thereby limit their freedom of
movement. Such laws, the Court held, were inconsistent with the
new Constitution, which guaranteed that restrictions on personal
liberty must be the result of regular judicial proceedings, subject to
standard procedural safeguards. 39 Nullifying such laws was enough to
restore the individual citizen's freedom of movement to its rightful
constitutional place, and to establish the Constitutional Court as a
player on the postwarjudicial scene.

See supra note 20.
Among the numerous codes that had been promulgated during the fascist era
and carried forward in the new republic were the 1930 Criminal Code, 1930
Criminal Procedure Code, 1940 Civil Procedure Code, 1941 Peacetime Military
Criminal Code, 1942 Civil Code, and the 1942 Navigation Code. See THIERRY
DIMANNO,

LE

JUGE

CONSTITUTIONNEL

ET

LA

TECHNIQUE

DES

DECISIONS

EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE 78-79 n.198 (1997). "[R]oughly one-third
of the first forty decisions of the Court involved the constitutionality of criminal laws
and regulations, most of them of Fascist vintage." Taylor Cole, Three Constitutional
Courts, 53 AM. POL. Sa. REv. 963, 980 (1959).
38 See Sent. 1/1956, 1 Giur. Cost. 1, 6-7 (1956).
This decision was controversial.
Before the Constitutional Court began work in 1956, ordinary courts had been
provisionally empowered to strike down old laws that conflicted with the new
Constitution, according to the doctrine of jus superveniens - that when two laws
conflict, the newer law prevails. See COST. Transitional and Final Provisions, art. VII
("Until the Constitutional Court begins to function, [constitutional review] shall take
place in the forms and within the limits of the norms pre-existing the entry in force
of the Constitution."). It was by no means clear that the Constituent Assembly had
meant to shift this power to the Constitutional Court. In Germany, with its otherwise
similar system of centralized constitutional review, the power to strike down laws predating the 1949 Basic Law remained diffuse, in the hands of ordinary judges as well
as the Constitutional Court. See DONALD P. KOMMERs, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 59 (1989).
39 SeeSent. 11/1956, 1 Giur. Cost.
612, 616, 618 (1956).
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B. The ConstitutionalCourt's Searchfor Flexibility
1.

The Need for More Flexibility: Parliamentary Inertia,
New Social Rights, and Fresh Laws

The simple negative legislation approach often proved too blunt
and forceful a tool for the Constitutional Court for three reasons.
First, the Italian Parliament proved unable (or unwilling) to fill gaps
The
in the legal order after the Court invalidated laws.
proportionally elected legislature mirrored the multiple cleavages in
Italian society only too faithfully, making the formation of governing
coalitions an increasingly difficult task.40 The resulting process of
political compromise slowed the law-making process to a snail's pace
The
and occasionally led to complete legislative paralysis.
it
was
law,
a
down
it
struck
when
that
aware
was
Constitutional Court
It
stroke.
erasing years of delicate political negotiation in a single
would require enormous time and effort for Parliament to muster
enough political will to enact a new, reformed law. Given the already
high obstacles to legislative reform, the Court was understandably
cautious about adding hurdles of its own. This made the Court
particularly unwilling to nullify an entire law that was only partially
defective.
No procedures guarantee that Parliament will respond to
decisions of the Constitutional Court. The Constitution itself simply
instructs that the decisions of the Court are to be relayed to
Parliament "so that, as [it] may deem necessary, [it] may take steps in
the proper constitutional forms. 4 ' The internal rules of the Senate
From 1953 on, no party held a majority of the seats in Parliament, forcing
leaders to cobble together constantly shifting governing coalitions from a
bewildering array of political parties. Since World War II, Italian governments have
had an average life span of less than one year. See DAVID HINE, GOVERNING ITALY:
THE POLITICS OF BARGAINED PLURALISM app. 1 at 345-46 (1993); 1945-1996 ARCHIIO
DELLA POLITICA IN ITALIA (Gianfranco Pasquino ed., Laterza Multimedia 1997) [CD-

Rom]. Of course, to acknowledge the constant flux within government coalitions,
with its attendant braking effect on legislation, is not necessarily to claim that the
Italian political system was unstable. The long-standing dominance of the Christian
Democratic party provided strong elements of continuity in Italian politics until the
early 1990s. See general!yJOSEPHLAPALoMBARA, DEMOCRACY ITALIAN STYLE (1987).
4 CosT. art. 136. This command is repeated almost verbatim in the law that
establishes the Constitutional Court. See Law of March 11, 1953, art. 87, n.30, 62
GAZZETrA UFFIcIALE 984 ("The decision ... shall furthermore be communicated to
the Chambers... so that, as [it] may deem necessary, [it] may take measures within
[its] competence."). The likely meaning of these provisions is that Parliament can
amend the Constitution if it disagrees with the result reached by the Court. The
Parliament "can instead, if it wishes, replace the law declared unconstitutional with a
new law. It can also take steps to settle relationships as necessary upon the
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and Chamber of Deputies provide that Court decisions are
transmitted to the relevant parliamentary committees. Although the
committees are supposed to report back on whether the judgments
require legislative follow-up, in practice these rules are moribund.
Few reports are generated, and the committees rarely propose a
legislative response." A high-sounding "Standing Committee for the
Study of Constitutional Court Decisions" has been repeatedly
established within the Chamber of Deputies, but entire parliamentary
sessions may pass without it meeting."4 The Prime Minister has power
to introduce bills responding to constitutional problems raised by the
Constitutional Court, but he is under no concrete duty to track and
respond to all decisions that call for a parliamentary response.45
There is no equivalent to the law recently enacted in the United
Kingdom, whereby a judicial decision that a British law is
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights
triggers a fast-track amendment procedure."
The Constitutional
Court often has had occasion to complain about Parliament's
unresponsiveness to its imprecations for reformY.
A second problem for the Court was that some of the laws it
evaluated dealt with complex social and welfare rights, so that
invalidating those laws on constitutional grounds would often have
unforeseen and unfortunate consequences for the well-being of
Italian citizens.
The 1948 Constitution enshrined more than
declaration of unconstitutionality of the norm to the extent that, prior to the
declaration, the norm had effect and was applied, in judgments or otherwise."
Claudio Tucciarelli, Le istituzioni a due marce: Corte costituzionale e Partamento tra
sentenze poco seguite e seguito poco sentito, 16 QUAD. CosT. 293, 299 (1996).
42 Rules of the Chamber of Deputies, art. 108; Rules of the Senate,
art. 139. For a

more detailed description of these parliamentary procedures, see Nicola Assini, Il
seguito (legislativo) delle sentenze della Corte costituzionale in Parlamento, in 1 SClrrt IN
ONORE DI VEZIO CRIsAFULU 21, 36-37 (1985); Tucciarelli, supra note 41, at 303-08.
4s See Tucciarelli, supra note 41, at 308-13. Tucciarelli
highlights "the scant
attention paid by Parliament to the application of the provisions" for legislative
follow-up to constitutional rulings, noting that only seven decisions of the Court were
the subject of formal discussions regarding follow-up in parliamentary committees
during the previous five legislatures. Id.
See id. at 309.
45 See id. at 300 (discussing role of prime
minister).
See Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 4 (Eng.) (authorizing judicial
declaration of incompatibility); Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 10 (Eng.)
(authorizing minister to propose fast-track amendment upon finding of
incompatibility).
47 See, e.g., Sent. 243/1993, 38 Giur. Cost. 1756, 1773 (1993) (stating
that if the

Court failed to declare a law unconstitutional after Parliament had ignored repeated
urgings of the Court to enact reforms, the Court would end up protecting the
legislature's inertia rather than its discretion).
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guarantees against government intrusion into the private sphere.
The Constitution also called upon the government to promote social
goals, such as education, health, and workers' welfare. When laws
advanced these rights only imperfectly, for example, by providing
workers' compensation for some, but not all, job-related injuries, the
Court faced a quandary.
If the Court nullified the workers'
compensation statute, all workers would be left without assistance,
thereby eviscerating the constitutional goal of protecting workers. If
the Court left the law inviolate, however, then many workers would
not enjoy the promises of protection that the Constitution extended
to them.49
Similar problems arose under the constitutional guarantee of
equal treatment.
For example, different classes of workers
complained that their contributions to the national health-care
system were uneven. 50 For the Court to strike down the entire healthcare financing system would injure the constitutional value of
universal health care. Yet, for the Court to sit on the sidelines would
seem to be an abdication of its duty. Tinkering with the distribution
of benefits was likewise problematic both from a legal standpoint,
because the Constitution gave no guidance as to the proper
allocation of health costs among the population, and from a political
standpoint, because the Court's decisions could drastically increase
state liabilities in a time when fiscal austerity was increasingly
demanded.
Third, the Court began to face more challenges to recently
passed laws, which only highlighted its countermajoritarian nature by
placing it in the position of having to invalidate laws that enjoyed the
current support of a majority of the people's elected representatives.
By the 1970s, the Court had cleared away most of the problematic
fascist-era laws, and many important cases involved laws enacted by
the postwar republican assembly. The Court was still struggling with
a tremendous backlog of cases, so its decisions at first involved laws
passed by previous parliaments, long since dissolved. In the mid-

48 See COST. art. 34 (education), 32 (health), 38 (worker's welfare).
49 See Sent. 206/1974, 19 Giur. Cost. 1714 (1974)
(criticizing, but declining to

invalidate, a law that authorized recovery only for job-related diseases that appeared
in a statutory table); Sent. 140/1981, 26 Giur. Cost. 1348 (1981) (declining to
invalidate that same law and encouraging lower courts to interpret recent statutory
amendments so as to permit recovery for diseases not listed in the table); Sent.
179/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 639 (1988) (issuing an "additive" judgment that authorized
recovery for unlisted diseases).
5o See Sent. 431/1987, 32 Giur. Cost. 2914 (1987).
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1980s, however, the Court finally caught up on its docket." At this
point, it began facing challenges to laws passed by parliaments that
were still in power, and which were thus fresh from the crucible of
legislative debate.
These three evolving phenomena - parliamentary inertia,
unforeseen
complications of enforcing new constitutional
guarantees, and increasingly swift review of freshly minted laws made the simple power to strike down a law seem a
disproportionately strong response to constitutionally defective laws.
The discussion that follows will review several forms of "passive
activism" that the Court used to tailor its judgments more narrowly,
stretching its powers in unanticipated ways to avoid striking down
laws. As eachtechnique revealed its limitations, however, the Court
continually turned to new and innovative approaches - moving from
statutory interpretation, to additive judgments, to declaring a law
temporarily constitutional. Most recently, the Court has resorted to
the practice of pronouncing laws unconstitutional without
invalidating them.
2. Statutory Interpretation
As a straightforward way to avoid striking down laws, the
Constitutional Court began asserting its power to interpret not only
the provisions of the Constitution, but also the statutes it was
reviewing. 2 This assertion aroused great controversy at first, since
51 See Paolo Caretti, L'eliminazione dell'arretratoe i nuovi sviluppi della
giurisprudenza
costituzionale, 9 QUAD. COST. 391 (1989) (discussing the possibilities of new activity in

Constitutional Court after the elimination of case backlog).
52 See Sent. 3/1956, 1 Giur. Cost. 568, 574 (1956) (asserting that
the
Constitutional Court is charged with autonomy to interpret not only the
constitutional provision in question, but also the ordinary law that is supposed to
violate the Constitution, though always taking into account the interpretation placed
on the law by other courts). The Court's efforts to interpret statutes initially met
with particular opposition when the Court rejected an interpretation of a statute
proffered by the judge certifying a constitutional question. Some commentators
argued that statutory interpretation fell exclusively within the domain of "real
courts," a category to which the Constitutional Court purportedly did not belong
because its power to review the constitutionality of laws was a "political" duty that fell
outside the traditional "technical" domain of courts in the civil law tradition. With
the passage of time, all judicial actors seem to have agreed on a legal middle ground.
When push comes to shove, the Constitutional Court defers to the "living law": a
widespread, consensus interpretation of a statute that is accepted throughout the
ordinary courts, particularly a definitive interpretation by the Court of Cassation.
This doctrine prevents the Constitutional Court from disturbing settled expectations
about statutes, the meanings of which have been widely accepted. In return, other
actors in the Italian legal system have conceded the Constitutional Court's
independent role in interpreting statutes as ancillary to its power to review the
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statutory interpretation had been the exclusive domain of the
ordinary courts, headed by the Court of Cassation. The Court
grounded this authority on the jurisprudential theory that it reviews
not the text of a law, but rather the "norms" or rules that can be
extrapolated from a law. This approach draws on the language of
Article 136 of the Italian Constitution, which authorizes the Court to
declare the unconstitutionality of "una norma di legge," translatable as
a legal "rule" or "norm.""s American law does not use any term of art
that precisely corresponds to the Italian idea of a "norm," but the
notion is not a foreign one. At bottom, a "norm" simply refers to a
particular interpretation of a statute. This emphasis on reviewing
individual interpretations has allowed the Court to develop two ways
to avoid striking down a law in its entirety.
First, the Court interprets laws to avoid constitutional questions.
In what have become known as interpretive judgments, the Court
frequently rejects a characterization of the statute offered by the
ordinary court below, and instead adopts an interpretation of its own
that is compatible with the Constitution. According to a canon of
judicial interpretation that echoes the principles set forth by Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,5 6 the Court must
constitutionality of legislation, particularly when the interpretation of a statute is not
yet consolidated.
For a discussion of some conflicts between the Italian
Constitutional Court and ordinary courts over the power of statutory interpretation,
see ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 18, at 286-91, 312; Francesco Casavola, La Giustizia
costituzionale nel 1992, 38 Giur. Cost. 620, 623-24 (1993).
53 See generally HANS KELSEN, A PuRE THEORY OF LAw (1934). The
elaboration of
this distinction between norms and the text of a law is heavily indebted to Kelsen. See
id.

See, e.g., Riccardo Guastini, Rules, Validity, and Statutory Construction, in1 ITALIAN
STUDIES IN LAw 11, 16 (Alessandro Pizzorusso ed., 1992). One author defined a
"norm" by stating, "I name 'rule' or 'norm' any sentence which is the meaning
54

ascribed (by anyone) to a statutory sentence .

. . ."

Id.

The definition went on

further to state, "a rule is a part of an interpreted text." Id.
55 See DIMANNO, supra note 37, at 160-63 (discussing cases in
which the Court
grounds its interpretation solely in the statutory text), 173-76 (discussing cases in
which the Court's interpretation is influenced more by a desire to avoid a conflict
between statute and Constitution).
For example, the Court recently disagreed with a lower court's interpretation of
a statute governing pretrial release. In the case at bar, the defendant had initially
been placed under house arrest. A lower-court judge determined that there was no
longer any reason to impose such a limitation, but believed that the criminal
procedure code precluded him from modifying the terms of pretrial release sua
sponte. The judge certified a question to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the
limit on his authority to modify the terms of release violated the Constitution. The
Court avoided the constitutional question by interpreting the code to authorize the
judge to ease pretrial release conditions sua sponte. See Sent. 89/1998.
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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"keep alive a legal rule, when it can be given at least one meaning
that is consistent with the Constitution."5 7 Such a decision is not
binding precedent because it formally falls within the category of a
sentenza di figetto, and in any event, the last word on statutory
interpretation belongs to the Court of Cassation. The Constitutional
Court, therefore, can read a statute creatively only when the ordinary
courts have not yet settled on the proper reading of a statute, and
even then, the Court of Cassation is free to reject the constitutional
tribunal's interpretation in later cases. Nevertheless, the Court's
opinions in interpretive judgments usually leave little room for doubt
that a contrary interpretation of the statute would be struck down.
This veiled threat lends real-world effect to an otherwise
"nonbinding" precedent."
For example, one of the Court's earliest cases involved a fascistera law that authorized government prefects to take measures "for
the protection of public order and public safety." Several parties
challenged the law for vagueness, arguing that it gave prefects carte
blanche to issue orders that violated citizens' civil rights. The Court
agreed with the parties that such a broad reading of the law could
lead to constitutional problems. To avoid those difficulties, the
constitutional judges endorsed a different, narrower interpretation of
the statute. These judges agreed with the decisions of several lower
courts that a prefect's orders were subject to strict limitations of time,
place, and necessity, and were reviewable by administrative tribunals
to

ensure

the

protection

of individual

rights. 59

Under this

interpretation, the Court declined to strike down the statute. It
thereby tried to salvage as much of the legislature's project as
possible, while avoiding gaps in government authority to preserve
public order.
57

Sent. 368/1992, 37 Giur. Cost. 2935, 2942 (1992).

In his concurring opinion

in Ashwander, Justice Brandeis set forth seven principles developed by the United
States Supreme Court for avoiding the adjudication of constitutional questions. His
seventh principle stated: "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal

principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
58
On occasion, the threat is not veiled at all. Witness a 1993 Court decision,
declining to strike down a provision of the criminal procedure code only if it was
interpreted to authorize a judge to order, sua sponte, the collection of further
evidence in criminal investigations. Under any other interpretation, the Court
stated, the statute would be unconstitutional. See Sent. 111/1993, 38 Giur. Cost. 901,
919 (1993) ("[An] interpretation different from one described here would
contradict... the constitutional principles cited in this decision.").
59 See Sent. 8/1956, 1 Giur. Cost. 602
(1956).
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In the second interpretive technique, the Court strikes down
only particular norms or interpretations arising from a statute. By
severing the unconstitutional applications and leaving intact other
legitimate interpretations, the Court is able to cushion the blow of a
declaration of unconstitutionality. 60 To illustrate how this works, let
us return to the law giving prefects open-ended authority to ensure
"public order." Despite the Court's 1956 decision endorsing a
narrow reading of this law, prefects continued to issue broad-ranging
orders that seriously curtailed civil rights. Furthermore, the Court of
Cassation held that prefectual orders were exempt from searching
administrative review, thereby rejecting the interpretation offered by
the constitutional judges. In 1961, a second challenge to the law was
certified to the Constitutional Court, this time with more success.
The Court invalidated the law to the extent that it granted prefects the
power to issue orders that violate constitutional rights or exceed the
normal strictures of administrative law. Only that "norm" was
unconstitutional, and the Court effectively severed it from the rest of
the statute. Because the judgment struck down the statute only
partially,all other "norms" remained in place. Thus, prefects retained
authority to regulate public order as long as they respected the basic
elements of legality: the order must be of limited duration, keyed to
the necessity and urgency of the problem, adequately explained and
published, and otherwise in conformity with law. 6 1 This left intact as
much of the legislature's project as was consistent with the
Constitution.
3. Additive Judgments: Reading in "Missing" Provisions
The Court has tried to avoid striking down unconstitutional laws
in yet another creative way: It fixes them itself. More precisely, the
Court declares a law invalid to the extent that it lacks a
constitutionally required rule, and then effectively inserts the missing
rule into the statute. Hence, Italian lawyers refer to these judgments
as "additive" decisions. For example, in 1970 and 1972, the Court
held a criminal defense counsel statute unconstitutional to the extent
60 See DIMANNO, supra note 37, at 210-15. The Italian
Court's desire to conserve
legislation by severing unconstitutional interpretations is mirrored in the United
States doctrine of severability of unconstitutional textual portions of statutes. Regan
v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). For example, the Supreme Court has stated:
"In exercising its power to review the constitutionality of a legislative Act, a federal
court should act cautiously. A ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people. Therefore, a court should refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary." Id. at 652.
61 SeeSent. 26/1961, 6 Giur. Cost. 525 (1961).
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that it did not permit counsel to be present during critical pretrial
events such as interrogation of the defendant and deposition of
adverse witnesses. What is remarkable about additive judgments is
that because the Court formally has power only to invalidate legal
rules, it had to frame its decisions as "striking down" a legislative
omission. In doing so, the Court relied on the distinction between a
law and the norms that arise from that law. According to the Court,
the code of criminal procedure embodied a rule, or norm, that
defense counsel could not be present at key pretrial events. Such a
norm was unconstitutional, and could therefore be invalidated even
though it appeared in no legal text. As a practical matter, the effect
of this judgment was to "add" a provision permitting counsel to
attend pretrial events. 62
Historically, the Court first made use of additive judgments to
achieve the primary goal set for it by the Constituent Assembly: to
safeguard individual rights against state intrusion, as in the criminal
defense context described above. In part because these decisions did
not impose any easily measurable financial costs on the state, and
because the Court was playing its respected role as guarantor of
individual freedom, its decisions were generally accepted. As time
went on, however, the Constitutional Court began to face more
complex cases involving newer laws, including state spending
programs that formed the basis of the Italian welfare state. Citizens
increasingly complained that the state distributed benefits unevenly,
in violation of the equality guarantee of the Constitution. These
complaints frequently involved welfare benefits, such as workers'
compensation, or pay scales at state institutions, such as teachers'
salaries. In response, the Court often added "missing" provisions to
increase the class of people entitled to higher payments from the
state.
Consider a typical case involving the equality provision of the
Italian Constitution. In 1975, university professors challenged a law
that set their maximum salary below that of state managerial
employees with the same level of seniority. The Court reasoned that,
because Parliament had for decades pegged the salaries of professors
and managers at the same level, principles of equality required that
professors continue to receive the same treatment absent explanation
from Parliament. The Court, therefore, issued an additive judgment,
declaring it unconstitutional to pay professors lower salaries than

62 See Sent. 190/1970, 9 Giur. Cost. 703 (1970); Sent. 63 & 64/1972,
11 Giur.

Cost. 238, 256 (1972).
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state bureaucrats.
The result of this judgment was to entitle
professors immediately to higher salaries.0 Such a decision had
significant financial repercussions for the state and met with much
criticism."4
In light of the broad array of social welfare spending in Italy,
plus the enormous number of citizens employed by the state and
state-owned businesses, such Court decisions placed ever-growing
strains on the Italian treasury. In 1991, for example, the government
was forced to appropriate an additional 600 billion lire (about 500
million dollars in 1991 dollars) to cover unforeseen expenses
stemming from the Court's decisions.6 The added financial burdens
were particularly unwelcome during the 1980s, as the government
struggled to bring public debt into line with the Maastricht criteria
for European economic integration.6 The increasing number of
such decisions required more attention from the government. In
1988, Parliament required that, whenever a new judgment of the
Constitutional Court might increase government spending, the
relevant ministry should notify the Minister of the Treasury who, in
turn, should prepare an appropriate legislative response." Against
this background, the Constitutional Court's practice of issuing
additive judgments in public expenditure cases faced mounting
criticism, especially from the Ministry of the Treasury.6
Some
suggested that the Court's decisions violated Article 81 of the
Constitution, which requires that all government spending laws
indicate their source of funding. The theory was that when a Court
decision expanded the range of beneficiaries under a state welfare
program, the Court was in effect appropriating funds. This skewed
the budget adopted by the legislature and, it was claimed, violated
Article 81.
Even though the Court (and most legal scholars) rejected the
notion that Article 81 prohibited it from issuing decisions that led to
higher state expenditures, the constitutional judges took quite
seriously the charge that their decisions were obstructing national
0 See Sent. 219/1975, 20 Giur. Cost. 1650 (1975).
SeeTucciarelli, supranote 41, at 311.
65 See Enrico Grosso, La sent. n. 88 del 1992:
64

un'alternativa alle "additive di

prestazione", 37 Giur. Cost. 2374, 2375 n.3 (1992).
66 Italy's public debt ballooned from 38% of GDP in 1970 to a peak
of 122.9% in
1996. See Vincent Della Sala, Hollowing Out and Hardening the State: European
Integrationand the ItalianEconomy, 20 W. EUROPEAN POL. 14, 23 (1997).
L. 362/1988, art. 7, ci. 7; see also Tucciarelli, supra note 41, at 300 (discussing
role of government in responding to the Constitutional Court's decisions).
68 See Grosso, supra note 65, at 2377 n.7; DIMANNO, supra note
37, at 428.
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attempts at fiscal austerity. 0 A number of proposals were vetted. One
option was to return to a bare-bones negative legislation model:
When faced with unequal distribution of benefits, the Court should
apply its duty to annul the offending statute quite literally and strike
down the entire benefits statute. Others proposed that the Court
should reject all equality challenges to benefits statutes because there
was no legal basis for deciding how to remedy the inequality, that is,
the Court could never determine whether the statute was "missing" a
provision increasing one group's benefits or decreasing another's. In
many cases, the Court seems to have been attracted to this view and
brusquely turned away certified questions in light of the plurality of
choices for fixing a statute - choices that, it said, only a legislator was
entitled to make. 70 In a further effort to minimize the financial
impact of its decisions, the Court limited the retroactive effects of its
judgments, often by declaring that a law had only recently "become"
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court ruled that it was up to the
ordinary courts to determine the retroactive effects of its decisions in
0 The Court's ambivalence on this point is illustrated in the press conferences of
the President of the Constitutional Court. In 1989, President Saja emphatically
stated that "an increase in public spending can never be considered the necessary
and direct consequence of the Court's decisions, because the political powers can
simply reform the entire area by redistributing, in conformity with the Constitution,
the same sums already appropriated." Francesco Saja, La Giustizia Costituzionale nel
1989, Conferenza Stampa, 115 Foro It. 65, 69 (1990). The next year, however, the new
President, Giovanni Conso, suggested that the Court should take into account the
national fisc as one of many elements having constitutional value. See Giovanni
Conso, La Giustizia Costituzionale nel 1990, Conferenza Stampa, 114 Foro It. 109, 158
(1991).
For the views of a wide array of Italian law professors, see the proceedings of a
seminar organized by the Constitutional Court on the question of Article 81. LE
SENTENZE DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE E L'ART. 81, U.C., DELLA COsrrruzioNE: AlTI
DEL SEMINARIO SVOLTOSI IN RoM.A, PALAZZO DELLA CONSULTA, NEI GIORNI 8 E 9
NOVEMBRE 1991 (1993); see also Grosso, supra note 65, at 2376-80 (reviewing the

Court's jurisprudence in reaction to criticism of the costs of its judgments);
Leopoldo Elia, Le sentenze additive e la pitt recente giurispnrdenzadella Corte costituzionale
(ottobre 81 - luglio 85), in 1 ScRrTrr SU LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE IN ONORE DI VEZIO
CRJSAFUkI 300, 313 (1985) (distinguishing between "additive" decisions that protect
individual rights at no obvious cost to the state, and decisions that expand classes of
beneficiaries at the expense of the national treasury).
70 See PINARDI, supra note 22, at 81-84; Giovanni Virga, Ordinanze dinammissibilitti
della Corte costituzionale e potere del giudice di merito di disapplicare norme che reputi
incostituzionali, 111 Foro It. 455 (1988) (addressing the possible responses by lower
courts to Constitutional Court's growing reluctance to issue additive judgments).
It is worth noting that the Court's efforts to clear an immense backlog of
decisions in the 1980s may have fueled its propensity to summarily refuse to deal with
some cases, much as the United States Supreme Court uses its discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction to allocate its own scarce decisional resources. See generally Caretti, supra
note 51; Saja, supra note 69, at 65 (noting elimination of backlog).
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particular cases. Such decisions effectively limited claims for back
payments to newly eligible beneficiaries and thereby reduced the
drain on state funds that would flow from the Court's decisions.7
As with its practice of statutory interpretation, the
Constitutional Court eventually developed limits on when it will issue
an additive judgment. For example, the Court has steadfastly refused
to add in missing provisions in criminal cases, when gap-filling might
result in greater criminal sanctions. In the civil context, the Court is
more flexible. In an apt turn of phrase, Vezio Crisafulli described the
Court's self-imposed standard for when it should strike down a
legislative omission, thereby supplying a norm that is "missing" from
a challenged law: The Court must stay within the "rime obbligate," or
"prescribed verses" of the statute.
Perhaps the metaphor works
71 See Sent. 49/1970, 15 Giur. Cost. 202
(1970).

On the Court's attempts to modulate the temporal effects of its judgments,
see
the numerous contributions to EFETrI TEMPORALI DELLE SENTENZE DELLA CORTE
COSTITUZIONALE ANCHE CON RIFERIMENTO ALLE ESPERIENZE STRANIERE:
ATTI DEL
SEMINARIO DI STUDI TENUTO AL PALAZZO DELLA CONSULTA IL 23 E 24 NOVEMBRE 1988

(1989).
The Court's efforts to reduce the monetary costs ofjudgments against the state
echoes some aspects of the American doctrine of state sovereign immunity. As the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment, federal
courts cannot order states to pay monetary damages in compensation for past injury.
Thus, a federal court cannot compel a state to make back payments to beneficiaries
of social welfare programs. Yet, courts can enjoin a state from withholding future
payments as they become due. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 658-59 (1974)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive payment of public assistance
benefits that had been wrongfully withheld by Illinois).
See Sent. 467/1991, 36 Giur. Cost. 3805 (1991). In this case, the Court stated
that it would not insert omitted provisions into a law regarding differentiated
penalties for conscientious objectors to military conscription because such an
outcome might result in the imposition of higher penalties on one class of objectors.
See id. at 3816. The Italian Court's response in such cases has been to declare the
question "inadmissible," which here roughly corresponds to the American notion of
"nonjusticiable." Thisjudicial reluctance to tinker with criminal statutes is embodied
in the "principle of legality," common to both civil and common-law systems,
whereby all penal sanctions must be set exclusively by the legislature. Compare COST.
art. 25, cl. I ("[N]o one may be punished except by virtue of a law that entered into
force before the act performed.") with United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, I I U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that United States federal courts have no
jurisdiction to create common-law crimes).
74 See Vezio Crisafulli, La Corte Costituzionale ha vent'anni,
in LA CORTE
COSTITUZIONALE TRA NORMA GIURIDICA E REALTA SOcIALE 69, 84 (Nicola Occhiocupo
ed., 1978). Additionally, the Constitutional Court has required the lower-court judge
to indicate what "verse" he thinks is constitutionally necessary when certifying the
question to the Court. Failure to identify the "missing" provision will lead the Court
to reject the certification out of hand. See Franco Modugno & Paolo Carnevale,
Sentenze additive, "soluzione costituzionalmente obbligata" e declaratoriadi inammissibilith per
mancata indicazionedel "verso" della richiesta addizione, 35 Giur. Cost. 519 (1990).
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better in English this way: Judges may not rewrite statutes in free
verse. A judge may add only those clauses that the Constitution
requires. When the choice among a "variety of solutions" depends on
a "discretionary balancing of values," the Court has held that it may
not try to fix the statute.75
4.

Temporary Constitutionality: The Precursor to
Informal Declarations of Unconstitutionality

Sometimes the Constitutional Court faces a statute with a
constitutional defect that it can neither interpret away, sever, nor
simply fix on its own, yet the judges are still not willing to strike down
the law. In some of these cases, the Court has resorted to yet another
technique that pushes the boundaries of constitutional adjudication:
It declares the law only temporarily constitutional. This solution has
been invoked in two kinds of cases.
In the first set of cases, the Court has allowed Parliament to
stretch the limits of its powers to deal with "emergency" situations of
limited duration. For example, Parliament passed a law authorizing
lengthy pretrial detention for suspected terrorists during the 1980s,
when Italy was struggling against a wave of domestic terrorism. The
Court upheld the law, otherwise constitutionally problematic, on the
grounds that it had been adopted "in an emergency situation" that
was "exceptional and grave, but also essentially temporary."7 6 The
Court then put Parliament on notice that if reforms failed to
materialize within a reasonable amount of time, the law in question
would "become" unconstitutional, and the Court would strike it
down. Although the wave of terrorism 'justified unusual77 measures,
these lose legitimacy if unjustifiably prolonged over time.
In other cases, the Court has worried that striking down a law
would only worsen the constitutional situation. Consider a pension
program that distributes benefits unequally. Assume that the statute
is worded clearly enough to leave no room for interpreting the
problem away. There is no apparent legal standard for deciding
whether to raise the benefits of one group rather than to lower the
benefits of another, and so the Court cannot fix the law itself without
considering nonlegal factors. Yet while the default option of striking
down the pension law would solve the equality problem, it would
seriously impair the provision of a subsistence income to the elderly

75

76

Sent. 109/1986, 31 Giur. Cost. 612, 615 (1986).
Sent. 15/1982, 27 Giur. Cost. 85, 102 (1982).

77 Id.
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a constitutional guarantee in Italy78 - not to mention throw into
chaos the settled expectations of retirees who survive on their
monthly checks.
For this reason, the Constitutional Court has balanced not only
the competing constitutional values implicit within a challenged
statute, but also other constitutional values that would be threatened
if the statute were wiped off the books.9 In some cases, the Court has
struck a balance by letting the law stand temporarily on the grounds
that, for the time being, the law does not conflict with the Constitution.
As Gustavo Zagrebelsky has put it, the Constitutional Court
"recognizes the unconstitutionality of the law 'to the extent' that it is
a permanent regulation of a certain field but, temporarily, does not
declare it unconstitutional in anticipation of its (hoped-for)
modification. 80 In the short term, such a decision buys time for the
legislature to take the lead in correcting the constitutional flaw, while
in the long term the decision lays ajuridical foundation for the Court
the law unconstitutional later if the legislature fails to act
to declare
8'
swiftly.

-

78

See CosT. art. 38, cl. 2 ("Workers have the right to be provided and assured

means that are adequate for their needs in life in case of accident, sickness, disability,
old age, and involuntary unemployment.").
79 See AGGIORNAMENTI IN TEMA DI PROCESSO COSTITUZIONALE (1990-1992), at 100
(Roberto Romboli ed., 1993) [hereinafter AGGIORNAMENTI]; PINARDI, supra note 22,
at 81 (noting that the Constitutional Court seems to balance the competing
constitutional values and often comes down in favor of protecting the principle of
the "continuity" of the legal order).
o ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 18, at 310 (emphasis deleted). For further discussion
of temporary constitutionality, see Andrea Pisaneschi, Le senteUze di "costituzionalitdt
provvisoria" e di "incostituzionalitti non dichiarata": la transitorieta nel giudizio
costituzionale, 34 Giur. Cost. 601 (1989). Pisaneschi discusses
judgments in which, faced with "emergency" or temporary norms
that can be considered unconstitutional in the abstract, the Court
"provisionally" rejects the challenge, apparently justifying the
exemption of those norms from constitutional review, and at the
same time inviting Parliament with a "warning" to change the
statute. If the legislature's inertia persists, evident after a more or
less lengthy series of decisions turning away challenges to the law,
the Court can finally issue a judgment striking down the law and
decisively resolve the question.
Id. at 601.
81 The notion of temporary unconstitutionality is not completely foreign to the
United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In 1977, the Court invalidated, as a
violation of equal protection, a statute that automatically granted Social Security
benefits to wives but not husbands of wage-earners. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 217 (1977). In response to that judgment, Congress enacted a new law making
all spouses automatically eligible for benefits. To limit the drain on the Social
Security trust fund, Congress reduced spousal benefits by the amount of any federal
pension the spouse received. Yet, recognizing that many wives had planned for
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The Court has resorted most conspicuously to declarations of
"temporary constitutionality" in the troublesome area of television
and radio broadcasting. Indeed, the Court has used nearly all of its
techniques to soften the impact of its judgments while nudging the
legislature toward reform. The Court's repeated warnings were
eventually met with legislative reform, though often partial and
painfully slow. The saga began in 1974, when the Court struck down
the law that granted the state a monopoly over radio and television
broadcasting. In an extraordinarily detailed ruling, the Court set
forth a number of guidelines to which reform of the industry would
have to adhere.8 ' A year later, Parliament responded by enacting a
reform bill that took some account of the principles enunciated by
the Court. The Court found this law inadequate, declared the state
monopoly unconstitutional at the local level, and called for
Parliament to strike a more appropriate balance between the twin
constitutional values of free enterprise and freedom of expression.
The failure of the 1975 law, which had embodied delicate political
compromises, stalled the reform process for several years. As Nicola
Assini puts it, the ensuing period is best characterized not as one of
legislative "inertia," but rather "unproductive activism." Numerous
bills were introduced, but the failure to achieve a political consensus
around any particular proposal meant that no law was passed.
A
retirement on the assumption that they would receive full Social Security payments,
Congress exempted from the pension-offset provision wives who would have become
eligible for full benefits within five years after the new law took effect. See Heckler v.
Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 733 (1984). In effect, Congress had re-enacted (for a fiveyear window) the same preference for wives that the Court had found
unconstitutional in Goldfarb. The Court upheld this pension-offset provision. It
reasoned that the preference was permissible because Congress intended to protect
reliance interests (a legitimate, gender-neutral goal), rather than to perpetuate
stereotyped gender roles. See Heckler, 465 U.S. at 745, 750-51. One of the Court's
final remarks echoes some of the concerns of the Italian Court in its temporary
constitutionality cases:
We have recognized, in a number of contexts, the legitimacy of
protecting reasonable reliance on prior law even when that requires
allowing an unconstitutional statute to remain in effect for a limited
period of time. Although an unconstitutional scheme could not be
retained for an unduly prolonged period in the name of protecting
reliance interests, or even for a brief period if the expectations sought
to be protected were themselves unreasonable or illegitimate, there is
no indication that the offset exception suffers from either of these
flaws.
Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
82 See Sent. 225/1974, 19 Giur. Cost. 1775 (1974) (listing
guidelines later
nicknamed the "Seven Commandments").
83 See Assini, supra note 42, at 30-31 (noting introduction of bills by individual
deputies, as well as failed government-backed plan in 1978).
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challenge to the system returned to the Court in 1981, but the
Constitutional Court simply continued to admonish Parliament that
it needed to reform the broadcasting system and to avoid excessive
concentrations of private power.
In 1988, the Court was confronted with yet another law that
permitted private national television and radio stations, but did not
limit ownership of multiple stations. Although the Court found that
the absence of ownership limitations was constitutionally defective,
the Court upheld the law on the grounds that it was professedly a
"temporary measure." 4 The Court warned that "if the approval of a
new law should be delayed beyond any reasonable time limit, the
challenged law... can no longer be considered provisional and shall
be deemed definitive: so that this Court, once again presented with
the same question, will not be able to avoid a different determination
with its ensuing consequences. ,85 InJanuary 1990, the challenged law
returned to the Court, but Parliament had not acted. The Court
avoided following up on its threat by delaying its decision until
August, when a new law was finally passed limiting private entities to
the ownership of twenty-five percent of all private networks. 6 At that
point, the Court simply remanded the case in light of the new statute.
The remand simply deferred the Court's obligation to review the
new law. In 1994, when the challenge returned to the Court, it struck
down the new limit because the twenty-five percent cap did not
adequately protect pluralism in broadcasting. The Court, however,
managed to give Parliament still more time to engineer reform, by
upholding as "temporarily constitutional" a government decree that
provisionally froze the status quo in the broadcasting industry,
allowing all previously operating television channels to continue
broadcasting.1 After fits and starts, a new law was finally put into
place in 1997, establishing a new set of comprehensive limits on the
ownership of multiple media outlets ranging from television to radio
to daily newspapersm Although this statute promises to satisfy the
criteria enunciated by the Court, no constitutional challenge has yet

84
85
86

See Sent. 826/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 3893 (1988).
Id. at 3938.
For a description of the sequence of events, see

PINARDI, supra note 22, at 95,
n.66, 130-31, n.25.
87 See Sent. 420/1994, 39 Giur. Cost. 3716, 3736-38 (1994);
Tucciarelli, supra note
41, at 312.
88 See Law of July 31, 1997, n. 249, in GAZZETrA UFFnCIALE, July
31, 1997, n.177
(supp. n.154).
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been brought. This chapter of the broadcasting controversy may not
be closed for the Constitutional Court.
C. Informal Declarationsof Unconstitutionality
All of these forms of "passive activism" have their limits. The
Court cannot always discern an interpretation that would save a
constitutionally doubtful statute; no way may be open for severing
unconstitutional applications of the law; and the statute may not be
amenable to repair by engrafting a "missing" provision.
Two further problems limit the utility of declaring laws
"temporarily constitutional." First, many problematic laws were
designed to be permanent, and few respond to emergency situations.
The Court cannot always pretend that Parliament intended to
respond to a temporary crisis. Second, the Court dampens the
urgency of its requests for reform by approving a law even
temporarily. It leaves open the question of how long the underlying
"emergency" might last, during which the law may remain on the
books. Even more importantly, these decisions convey the message
that Parliament was justified, if only marginally, in passing the law.
To declare a statute constitutional is often to impart legitimacy to it
- legitimacy that may reduce pressure to reform or amend the law. 9
As qualified as they are, declarations of "temporary constitutionality"
may be counterproductive because they send a mixed message: The
law ought to be fixed, but there is no rush.
Faced with this problem, the Court sometimes has announced
point blank that a law is unconstitutional, but then refused to nullify
it. In this way, the Court avoids both undesirable choices of either
striking down the law or issuing an additive judgment. The Court
then has to tackle the problem of parliamentary inertia by warning
that, if legislative reform is not forthcoming within a reasonable time,
the Court will be forced to make the fateful choice between annulling
the law or revising the law itself. By announcing that the law is
presently unconstitutional, the Court confers no legitimacy upon it.
As Andrea Pisaneschi has said, even as the Court pulls back from
89

See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 7, at 29-33, 129-33

(discussing the legitimating function of the United States Supreme Court); CHARLES
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 34-86
(1960). Black argued that "the most conspicuous function of judicial review may
have been that of legitimatizing rather than that of voiding the actions of
government." Id. at 53; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES (1982) (discussing how court decisions addressing the constitutionality of
obsolete statutes may influence the likelihood of legislative repeal or amendment of
those statutes).
L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT:
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nullifying unconstitutional laws, "in this retreat one can discern an
attempt by the Court to seize a position of greater power in its
dialogue with Parliament" than that offered by its declarations of
temporary constitutionality."
The section that follows looks first at the structure of these
"informal declarations of unconstitutionality." It then examines the
Court's ability to follow up on its decisions, and finally reviews the
criticism that Italian commentators have leveled against this practice.
1. Anatomy of the Technique
When the Court refuses to strike down an unconstitutional law,
its opinions almost always follow the same pattern: denounceFirst, the Court denounces the law as
decline-demand.
unconstitutional. The opinion leaves no doubt about how and why
the law violates constitutional principles. Next, the Court declines to
act. The judges wring their hands in despair over their inability to fix
the defects in the law and catalog their reasons for not resorting to
other types ofjudgments. Finally, the Court demands that Parliament
take reform into its own hands, but warns that the legislature cannot
delay for long. If the lawmakers fail to assume their responsibility,
then the Court will be forced to intervene, by either striking down or
modifying the law.9'
Two examples illustrate the Court's approach. First, consider
how the Court dealt with a law concerning parole for minors. In its
1975 reform of the criminal code, Parliament stated that the
provisions governing parole for adults would "temporarily" apply to
minors as well, until appropriate legislation could be enacted. Years
went by, and the legislature passed no special parole law for minors.
In 1978, the Court was faced with a challenge to the parole law, on
the grounds that the Italian Constitution requires particular
solicitude for the rehabilitation of youthful offenders and, therefore,
mandates more lenient parole possibilities. The Court agreed, but
suggested that the statute might be read flexibly to allow sentencing
Based on this
courts more leeway when dealing with minors.
interpretation of the law, the Court turned away the constitutional
90
91

See Pisaneschi, supra note 80, at 637.
For a detailed analysis of this category of decisions,

see PINARDI,

supra note 22,

at 80-95.

See Sent. 46/1978, 23 Giur. Cost. 537, 542 (1978) (noting that the statute

"seem[ed] susceptible to an interpretation" that permitted favorable parole
provisions for minors, and stating that such an interpretation was "the only one in
harmony" with the relevant constitutional provisions).
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challenge. The Court of Cassation, however, subsequently adopted a
more limited interpretation that required minors and adults to be
treated identically. The Court's first delaying tactic was therefore
unsuccessful.
In 1992, when the question returned to the Court, it resorted to
an informal declaration of unconstitutionality. Adhering to the
constitutional analysis of its earlier decision, the Court repeated that
minors are entitled to special treatment in the penal system. Because
the Court of Cassation had cemented its reading of the statute, the
option of another interpretive judgment in the spirit of Ashwander
was foreclosed. The Constitutional Court was forced to confront the
validity of the law head-on. The parole law was unconstitutional, the
Court announced, because "the requirements of rehabilitation and
re-socialization of juvenile delinquents . . . are still not entirely
satisfied."9'
Nevertheless, the Court declined to strike down the law. The
Court feared that eliminating the parole law would deprive minors of
all possibility of parole. This would injure the constitutional goal of
juvenile rehabilitation even more than the insufficiently lenient
parole law then in force. Furthermore, the danger of a legislative
void persisting was quite substantial, given that Parliament had
already delayed its promise of parole reform for sixteen years. The
Court chose not to issue an additive judgment that set more generous
parole conditions because one could imagine a myriad of ways to
foster rehabilitation for minors. For the Court simply to invent one
out of whole cloth, without the guidance of any legal standards,
would exceed the realm of proper judicial behavior and invade the
province of Parliament. "[T]he choice among the various means
must be entrusted to the legislator's discretion," the Court said, given
the availability of numerous solutions.9 The most desirable result was
one that only a legislature could achieve: a comprehensive reform of
the parole system. 95
Accordingly, the Court asked Parliament to act. The Court
warned, however, that it could not hold itself back forever. The
Court would strike down the law, it said, "if the legislature did not
promptly undertake to draw up regulations in this area, consistent
96
with constitutional principles" spelled out in the Court's opinion.

Sent. 125/1992, 37 Giur. COSL 1072, 1081 (1992).
See id. at 1082.
95 See id.
93
9

9

Id.
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The Court acted similarly in a case involving the independence
of military judges.
The Italian Constitution guarantees the
independence of the judges of all "special jurisdictions," including
military courts. 97 Since the founding of the republic, however, the
executive branch supervised military judges. Only in 1981 did
Parliament reorganize the military tribunals, providing that military
judges in the future would be self-governed by a body modeled on
the Superior Council of the Magistrature, which is responsible for the
ordinary courts. The reform legislation did not spell out the
composition of this body, but instead left those details for another
law to follow within a year. In the meantime, the law provisionally
empowered the Minister of Defense to appoint military judges, giving
only a consultative role to a committee of judges and prosecutors.98
Three years came and went, and Parliament never provided for the
composition of the self-governing judicial body.
In 1984, the Court faced a challenge to this law. After noting
that well over a year had "uselessly" gone by without any sign of
movement, the Court announced that the law was unconstitutional,
diplomatically stating that complaints about the law's constitutionality
"could not be said to lack validity." 99 Yet the Court backed away,
explaining that it could not choose either of the options suggested by
the lower court. On the one hand, the Court would not strike down
the transitory law because that would resuscitate the pre-1981 law,
which had placed military courts fully within the executive's
authority. Turning back the clock would violate the constitutional
guarantees of judicial independence even more grievously. On the
other hand, the Court could not impose a more creative solution for example, by placing the military courts under the alreadyestablished Superior Council of the Magistrature - without making a
choice among various solutions for which no legal principles offered
guidance. Leaving the problem for Parliament to fix, the Court
announced that resolution of this constitutional question was beyond
its purview. Quite emphatically, however, the Court declared that
"the legislator is bound

. . .

to fulfill without further delay the task of

creating an organ that will effectively guarantee the independence of
the militaryjudiciary."'0° Failure to do so would force the Court to act
differently, if faced anew with a challenge to the law.
See COST. art. 108.
See Sent. 67/1984, 29 Giur. Cost. 419, 421 (1984).
9
Id. at 421.
10 Id. For similar examples of the Court's withholding a judgment, see, for
example, Sent. 97/1994, 39 Giur. Cost. 884 (1994) (criticizing a law that imposes
97
98
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2. The Court's Follow-up on Its Decisions
The efficacy of these decisions depends on whether the Court is
willing and able to make good on its threats in a later case, by
invalidating the law if Parliament fails to act. Aside from the moral
and symbolic value of announcing a law's unconstitutionality, the
Court's power to nullify a law ultimately pressures the legislature to
move toward reform. The opportunity for follow-up is usually there
because lower courts are obliged to certify constitutional challenges
that are not "manifestly unfounded." Once the Constitutional Court
has formally announced in a declaratory judgment that a law is
unconstitutional, this threshold test seems undoubtedly satisfied.'0 '
As new challenges to the law percolate through the lower courts, the
Court should have a steady supply of opportunities to revisit the issue.
On occasion, the Constitutional Court takes advantage of these
renewed challenges to strike down a law. An example is furnished by
the line of cases involving military judges. Despite the Court's
admonitions in 1984 that the legislature establish a self-governing
body for military tribunals "without further delay," Parliament still
had not acted by 1987. As a practical matter, the "provisional" system
embodied in the 1981 reforms had ossified into permanence. When
a new challenge to the law was brought, the Court announced that
the legislative delay had worn out its patience. It was "no longer
tolerable," the Court said, that the appointment of military judges
remain completely under the control of the executive, flouting
constitutional guarantees of judicial independence. 2° The Court
overcame its hesitations and struck down the 1981 law that had
granted the Minister of Defense authority to appoint and remove
military judges. Leaving lower courts and Parliament to cope with
the resulting gap in appointment authority, the Court placed
responsibility for any confusion that might ensue squarely on the
shoulders of Parliament. The Court announced that the law's

identical penalties for failure to file a tax return, and timely filing of a tax return to
the incorrect office, where delay in delivery to the correct office exceeds one month;
complaining that Parliament had ignored the Court's exhortations for reform in
Sent. 82/1989 and 212/1989); Sent. 431/1993, 38 Giur. Cost. 3549 (1993) (holding

unconstitutional a law that permits a particular pension agency to recoup

overpayments from beneficiaries, even if the overpayment is solely due to the
agency's error, but declining to select an acceptable rule for recoupment in light of
the many constitutional options, and calling upon the legislature to "identify the

solution best suited to eliminate this situation out of tune with the Constitution").
101 SeeAGGIORNAMENTI, supra note 79, at 114.
102

See Sent. 266/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 1089, 1097 (1988).
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unconstitutionality "derives, in fact, from legislative inertia drawn out
over such a long time."' 3
Such a firm response is less common than one might expect
from the forceful language of the Court's opinions. The Court's
willingness to take action is not always commensurate with its ability
to do so. On numerous occasions, laws have returned unchanged to
the Court after having been declared unconstitutional, yet the Court
has limited itself to repeating its threats without striking them down.
Perhaps the most outstanding example is the long-running problem
of the "health tax." In 1987, the Court identified a number of
provisions in the system of contributions to the national health-care
system that violated various constitutional guarantees, most notably
that of equality. °' In particular, the Court criticized a system that
required self-employed workers to contribute more money than did
workers employed by others. The Court declined to strike down the
scheme, however, largely because it was unwilling to throw an already
incoherent health-care financing system into further chaos. Eleven
times since that first decision, the Court has declined to take up the
question.' 5 Five years after its first warning, the Court was still
wagging its finger at Parliament, warning that reform "cannot be
delayed endlessly, without the Court being forced to take the decisive
actions that, where needed, fall within its power."'06 The Court has
never been willing to take such "decisive action." Instead, it has
limited itself to acknowledging the sporadic attempts at reform made
by the legislative branch and noting with a sigh that the legislature
had at least made some "initial efforts to overcome the pre-existing
107
The
and, in large part, persisting incoherence" of the system.
Court's repeated refusals to strike down the health-care contribution
system, stretched over so long a period of time, has signaled to
Parliament that prolonged inactivity will not provoke any reaction
from the Court. This, in turn, has stripped the Court's warnings of
much of their force.

105 Id. at 1098. The Court held that its judgment invalidated only the provisional
grant of authority to the Minister of Defense. The Court avoided resuscitating the
earlier system, which had accorded the Minister plenary authority over judicial
appointments without even bothering to obtain the nonbinding opinion of the new
consultative bodies, by explaining that the 1981 law remained valid to the extent that
it r ealed the earlier system.
See Sent. 413/1987, 32 Giur. Cost. 2865 (1987).
105 See PINARDI,
106

107

supra note 22, at 93.

Sent. 256/1992, 37 Giur. Cost. 1979, 1986 (1992).
Id
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Even when the Court does follow up on its declaratory
judgments, it often does so half-heartedly and thereby casts doubt on
its readiness to strike down laws in other cases. Take the question of
public hearings before tax commissions mentioned at the beginning
of this Article. In two decisions in 1986 and 1988, the Court said that
the law closing tax hearings to the public was unconstitutional
because all court hearings must be open. Both times, however, the
Court declined to strike down the law and asked Parliament to
intervene.108 On the third challenge, in 1989, the Court finally
invalidated the law, stating that "a declaration of unconstitutionality
can no longer be put off.'' 9 The Court took this step, however, only
after reform was imminent. As the Court's opinion noted, a new law
permitting public hearings had already passed the Senate and was
awaiting a vote in the Chamber of Deputies."0 To use a medical
metaphor, the Court was willing to excise the diseased organ only
when a donor was waiting in the wings.
Who blinked first:
Parliament or the Court? Perhaps the threat of an adverse decision
by the Constitutional Court influenced the action of the legislature.
Or perhaps Parliament's decision to finally act gave the Court space
to strike down the law. Even when reform finally materialized, the
catalyzing effect of the Court's decisions is hard to quantify.
These examples illustrate how difficult it has been for the Italian
Constitutional Court to pressure Parliament into reforming
constitutionally problematic laws. The only "pressure" that the Court
can apply is its threat to strike down or modify those laws. In the
world of Italian politics, however, such pressures often are not strong
enough to spark legislators into action. Few votes may be at stake in a
law covering something like the self-government of military judges.
Alternatively, issues like radio and television broadcasting already
may be so politically charged that the Constitutional Court's threats
pale in importance alongside other social forces converging on the
political parties. When the Court declines to carry out its threats to
strike down or modify a law in the face of legislative inaction, it
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See Sent. 212/1986, 31 Giur. Cost. 1637 (1986); ord. 378/1988, 33 Giur. Cost.

1687 (1988).
109 Sent. 50/1989, 33 Giur. Cost. 252, 255 (1989).
110 See Law of May 22, 1988, n. 198. The Court held that its decision would have
no retroactive effect, so as not to disrupt final judgments already rendered in closed
hearings. See Sent 50/1989, 33 Giur. Cost. 252, 255 (1989). In his 1989 press
conference, President Saja of the Italian Constitutional Court explained that the
ruling was made purely prospective "to avoid .. . favoring tax evaders." Saja, supra
note 69, at 68.
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undermines its own credibility and further reduces its limited ability
to catalyze reform."'
Given these political realities, perhaps it is better not to think of
the Constitutional Court as trying to force Parliament to act, but
rather as leaving room for the legislature to act. The Court is
motivated more by a desire to hold itself back, to avoid acting when
its powers of decisionmaking either are too clumsy or would require
it to make too many discretionary decisions that are best left to the
democratically representative branches. The Court limits itself to
articulating guidelines that the legislature should follow when it
finally does engage in reform.
In the last few years, the Italian Court has begun to show greater
backbone. More frequently, when the legislature has evinced no
interest in reforming laws that the Court already has pronounced
unconstitutional, the Court has gone on to nullify those laws. This
has taken place most commonly in areas in which the Court had
earlier feared to issue additive judgments, due to the multiplicity of
ways to fix the unconstitutional law. In its follow-up decisions,
however, the Court has found a new way to overcome this fear.
Instead of inserting a "missing" provision itself, the Court merely sets
forth the general constitutional principles to which a new rule must
conform. It then invalidates the law and instructs the ordinary courts
to devise a stop-gap rule until Parliament revises the law. In this way,
the Court relieves individual litigants of application of the
unconstitutional law and2 lives up to its own duty to rule on the
constitutionality of laws."
I
See PINARDI, supranote 22, at 128 (noting that "the more a constitutional judge
manages to persuade the ordinary legislator that any protracted inertia will inevitably
be punished by the nullification of the law under review, the more that warning can
be said to be pressing and therefore (at least in theory) effective").
112 These decisions are known in Italian legal jargon as "sentenze additive di
principio" because the Constitutional Court sets forth only the constitutional
"principles" that should guide lower courts in their selection of a stop-gap rule.
Some commentators have described some of these judgments as "sentenze-meccanismo"
because the Court's judgment strikes down the statute to the extent that it lacks a
mechanism for protecting a certain constitutional right. In these cases, it is up to
Parliament (and pending legislative action, the courts) to devise a method of
protecting that right.
For example, in one case, the Italian Court held that the laws governing
computation of retirement bonuses were unconstitutional "to the extent that they do
Sent.
not provide mechanisms" taking into account certain types of income.
243/1993, 118 Foro It. 1 1729, 1742 (1993). The Court demanded that Parliament
legislate immediately, requiring that "[s]uch mechanisms shall be put into place by
the legislature according to discretionary choices that respect the principles
specifically indicated [in the Court's opinion]." Id. Reform, the Court said, "must
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To understand how the Court has begun to decide cases in this
manner, consider the line of cases dealing with conscientious
objectors to military service. When a conscientious objector does not
meet the usual statutory requirements for exemption from military
service, he is subject to a sentence that, once served, discharges his
draft obligation. A problem then arises: If a military judge suspends
this sentence, the objector could be called up for duty a second time.
If he again refuses to serve, the objector is subject to a new sentence
plus reinstatement of his earlier sentence. As the Court observed, this
exposed certain objectors to a theoretically endless "spiral of
punishments" that is constitutionally unacceptable. As early as 1989,
the Court refrained from striking down the law and called upon
Parliament to reform the statute."' In 1991, the Court turned away
another challenge to the law, even though it continued to recognize
the law's
"obvious unreasonableness
and,
therefore, ' 1 its
4
incompatibility with the value system set forth in the Constitution."
In 1997, in the face of continuing legislative inactivity, the Court
finally invalidated the law to the extent that it authorized multiple
punishments for the same crime."1 5 The Court did not specify exactly
how the law should protect the interests of conscientious objectors,
for example, by making suspension of a sentence irrevocable, or by
forbidding a second call-up of conscientious objectors. Instead, the
Court punted the question to the lower courts and the draft board to
find an interim solution pending legislative reform. According to the
Court,
[i]t belongs to the realm of interpretation and, eventually,
legislative choices to determine how [eliminating the possibility of
multiple punishment], from now on required by the Constitution,
may find expression in positive law:
whether through a
reconsideration of the administrative practice of the draft board,
or of substantive
or procedural criminal law regarding the matter
6
in question.1

occur in connection with the next appropriations law, or at the first useful
opportunity for devising and formulating overall budgetary policy." Id. The Court
had given Parliament ample warning that the Court might strike down this law. See,
e.g., Sent. 220/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 862 (1988); Sent. 763/1988, 33 Giur. Cost. 3482

(1988) (warning that persistence of an irrational scheme could lead to declaration of
unconstitutionality); ord. 419/1989, 34 Giur. Cost. 1962 (1989) (reiterating that its

warning was still "urgent").
113
14

115
116

See Sent. 409/1989, 34 Giur. Cost. 1906 (1989).

Sent. 467/1991, 36 Giur. Cost. 3805, 3816 (1991).
SeeSent. 43/1997, 42 Giur. Cost. 383 (1997).
Id. at 393.
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In effect, the Court disapplied the law to those affected, while leaving
bodies to work out the details of how this should
other government
7
be achieved.Y
3. Criticism of the Technique
Three principal criticisms can be leveled at the Court's method
of declaring a statute unconstitutional without striking it down. The
first two issues are closely related. First, the practice neglects
individualized justice because it leaves some litigants subject to an
unconstitutional statute that the Court has determined to be
illegitimate. It certainly seems unfair to sacrifice the rights of single
litigants upon the altar of judicial self-restraint. 8 Second, by
declining to strike down laws that it finds unconstitutional, the Court
reduces the incentive for parties to raise constitutional issues. The
Court could mitigate these problems by suspending application of
the law in the case at bar, though not in general, thereby protecting
the parties involved in the litigation and preserving their incentive to
pursue constitutional complaints." 9 This seems to be the practice of
the German Constitutional Court, which also can declare a law
"incompatible" with the federal constitution while declining to nullify
it.'20 It has long been accepted, however, that the Italian Court's
See Andrea Guazzarotti, La Corte costituzionale "a colloquio con se stessa".
Un'additiva "con vincolo di risultato" suU'obiezione di coscienza al servizio militare,42 Giur.
Cost. 395, 405 (1997) (discussing how the Constitutional Court sends cases back to
the ordinary courts and/or the legislature to choose the means for applying the
constitutional principles announced by the Court).
118 See Pisaneschi, supra note 80, at 631-33.
119 The United
States Supreme Court, for example, has recognized the
117

importance of preserving litigants' incentives to raise novel constitutional claims. See
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1967) (holding that a new rule of criminal
procedure announced by the Supreme Court should apply only prospectively,
though it is proper to apply the new rule in the case creating that rule, to ensure that
litigants retain an incentive to raise novel claims). But see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 316 (1989) (holding that, in deference to considerations of federalism, federal
courts generally cannot grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners who seek the
benefit of a novel rule).
10 The German Court has authority to determine
whether, and to what extent,
the unconstitutional law shall remain temporarily in force. See Klaus Schlaich, Corte
costituzionale e controllo suUe norne neUa Repubblica federale di Cerania,2 QUAD. CosT.
557, 575 (1982); Sabine Stuth, /i Bundesverfassungsgericht e il profilo tecnico delle sue
pronuncie, 9 QuAD. CosT. 287, 292-95 (1989); ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 18, at 309. It
seems that the Italian Court borrowed from the German Constitutional Court this
technique of declaring a law unconstitutional without striking it down. As in Italy,
the German Court developed the practice of declaring laws "incompatible"
("unvereinbar"), without any express constitutional or statutory authorization, out of a
similar system of constitutional review that foresaw only a bipolar choice between
striking down or upholding a statute. Originally an invention of the Court itself, but
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rulings are effective "erga omnes," and thus there seems to be no
legal basis for limiting its rulings to particular parties. So far, the
Court has found no way to mitigate this unfairness.
The third criticism is that the Court fails to set firm deadlines,
thereby weakening the urgency of its imprecations for legislative
reform. The Court rarely tells the legislature how long it will wait
before striking down or modifying a law. In many cases, the Court
has been willing to wait several years; sometimes, it waits indefinitely.
This creates much the same problem as declaring a law "temporarily"
constitutional. Such a practice undermines the Court's assertions
that reform is urgent and reduces the credibility of its threats to strike
down the law."' In the eyes of one commentator, Roberto Pinardi,
that is precisely what has happened in Italy: The Court has cried
"wolf' too often.22
According to Pinardi, the Court's decisions are internally
inconsistent, in the sense that the Court's self-restraint signals its
reluctance to strike down the law in the future. 23 That is, after the
Court has taken pains to explain why it will not invalidate or modify
an unconstitutional law now, it is hard to see why the situation should
be any different when a second challenge to the law presents itself in
the future. If the Court decides that certain constitutional values must
be protected by leaving the law intact, those constitutional values will
presumably deserve continuing attention in the future. As Pinardi
puts it, the judges' self-restraint exposes their belief that "elimination
of the challenged law would entail such serious consequences,

now codified in statute, the declaration of "incompatibility" has been used frequently
as an alternative to the more severe measure of declaring a statute null and void
("nichtig"). See KOMMERS, supra note 38, at 61; Schlaich, supra, at 575; ZAGREBELSKY,
supra note 18, at 308. Indeed, between 1951 and 1987, 144 of the 391 legal
provisions invalidated by the German Constitutional Court were merely declared
unconstitutional or incompatible (without suspending their general applicability),
compared to 247 provisions declared null and void. See KOMMERS, supra note 38, at
60.
121 SeeZAGREBELSKY, supra
note 18, at 310.
1
See PINARDI, supra note 22, 126-39.
12
See id.; see also Roberto Pinardi, La Carte ccoglie ...una questionefondata: verso
un nuovo "modello" di rispostagiurisprudenzialealprotrarsideU'inerzia legislativa?,40 Giur.
Cost. 2034 (1995) (speculating that Sent. 284/1995 signals a change of course from
the Court's informal declarations of unconstitutionality); Roberto Pinardi,
Discrezionalit legislativa ed efficacia temporale delle dichiarazioni di incostituzionalitti: la
sentenza n. 125 del 1992 come decisione di "'ncostituzionalitiaccertatama non dichiarata",
37 Giur. Cost. 1083 (1992); Roberto Pinardi, La sentenza n. 256 del 1992 e leficacia
monitoria delle decisioni di "rigetto con accertamento di incostituzionalit", 37 Giur. Cost.
1988 (1992); Roberto Pinardi, La Corte e illegislatore: spunti e reflessioni in tema di
efficacia pro futuro delle sentenze di accoglimento, 36 Giur. Cost. 788 (1991).
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injurious to the legal system, that the Court prefers not to annul it,"
despite the fact that those very same judges have concluded that the
law violates the Constitution.'2 4 Parliament can detect this reluctance
and will feel little compulsion to engage in the difficult game of
reform, knowing that the Court feels itself paralyzed.'25
Of course, the Court's assessment of what is constitutionally
"reasonable" is quite flexible. For one thing, the Court can seemingly
elevate anything to the dignity of a "constitutional value." In the
cases involving public tax hearings, for example, the Court seemed to
ascribe constitutional importance not only to the value of "public
hearings," but also to the "continuity of the legal system." This latter
goal, however, boiled down to little more than a desire not to give tax26
evaders a windfall by halting all proceedings against them.'
Furthermore, when ascribing a particular weight or intensity to a
constitutional value, the Court is not always guided by articulable
legal standards. Again, in the tax hearings cases, the Court did not
explain why it valued legal continuity over public hearings in its first
rulings, but reversed their priority in the final ruling. As a practical
matter, the Court's patience had worn thin. As a jurisprudential
matter, however, the Court offered no legal principle from which one
could have predicted the timing of the about-face.
The Italian Constitutional Court has not offered any convincing
solution to this problem. Again, the German Constitutional Court
If the
generally fixes *a strict deadline for legislative reform.
legislature fails to pass corrective legislation by that date, the court
to strike down the law, no matter what the
does not hesitate
'27
By contrast, when the Italian Court does nothing
consequences.
but reiterate its pleas for the legislature to take action, the Court
seems to confess that it is trapped in a constitutional no-man's land,
where it can neither condone nor condemn the unconstitutional law.
In doing so, the Court reveals its unwillingness to strike down the law
and eviscerates its only means of nudging the legislature to amend
the law.
124

PINARDI, supra note 22, at 130.

125

See id. at 134 (arguing that these decisions, far from obliging Parliament to

enact reforms, in fact serve as an implicit guarantee of the Court's future reluctance
to strike down the challenged law despite legislative inertia).
2 See Saja, supra note 69, at 68.
the German Constitutional Court recently declared
17 For example,
unconstitutional a provision of the income tax law. After a six-month deadline
passed without the legislature having fixed the defect, the Court automatically
invalidated the law and took away the Government's power to collect that particular
tax.
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II. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The experiences of the Italian Constitutional Court provide
valuable lessons for Americans. In particular, these experiences
illustrate how courts can introduce a delay between declaratory and
injunctive relief to give the political branches the first opportunity to
fix unconstitutional statutes. That is not to say that American courts
cannot improve on the Italian practice. American courts can better
protect the interests of litigants by retaining jurisdiction over cases,
enabling the courts to issue injunctive relief if legislative reform is not
forthcoming. Furthermore, American courts can impose and enforce
deadlines for legislative action, thereby making their threats of
injunctive relief more credible.
This section begins by describing various American legal
doctrines that authorize a court to declare a statute unconstitutional
but delay nullification of that statute. It then suggests that, in
exceptional cases, some of the reasons that have driven the Italian
Court to issue informal declarations of unconstitutionality might
support delaying injunctive relief as a matter of equitable discretion
in the United States. This is particularly true when judicial relief
threatens to seriously disrupt administration of the law or requires
judges to second-guess discretionary decisions, such as budgeting,
that are best left to the legislature. Finally, this section discusses
enforcement problems that flow from a proposed Balanced Budget
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as an example of a
problematic case in which American courts might put these ideas into
practice.
A. ComparableAmerican Legal Doctrines
The Italian Constitutional Court's practice of announcing that a
law is invalid, but refusing to annul it, is not unknown in United
States law. American courts can reach similar results by issuing a
declaratory judgment, exercising their equitable discretion to delay
or withhold injunctive relief, and retaining jurisdiction to monitor
legislative responses to their decisions.
Each of these powers
constitutes familiar territory for American judges.
1. Declaratory Judgments
Since the 1930s, American courts have been authorized to issue
purely declaratory judgments, that is, to define the legal rights of
parties to a controversy without ordering them to take any particular
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action. 2 Because these judgments do not place parties under any
legal obligations, any action inconsistent with the judgment does not
expose the parties to the danger of incurring penalties for disobeying
a court order.'29 A declaratory judgment can stand on its own,
although it can also lay the groundwork for subsequent orders of
more concrete relief, such as awards of monetary damages or
injunctions.'30 Of course, it is not unusual for an American court to
focus its attention on announcing parties' legal rights. To use Chief
Justice Marshall's words, one of the main
tasks of American courts
1 31
has always been "to say what the law is.

Declaratory judgments serve a number of purposes. First, they
let individuals obtain a "preventive" definition of their rights. Hence,
a citizen can challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute
without first violating it and running the risk of going to jail.3
Furthermore, individuals can obtain a declaration of a statute's
validity without making the difficult showing that they would suffer
irreparable harm under the law, as normally would be required to
obtain an injunction against enforcement of the law.'3
Most
128

See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, ch. 512 (1994) (codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2201(a)) (providing that a federal court "may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."). Most states
have adopted similar acts.
1
See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 126 (1971) (Brennan,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1994) ("Further necessary
or proper relief based on a
declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing,
against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.").
Is Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
1
Of course, parties can seek declaratory judgments in all sorts of situations, such
as property and contract disputes, that do not involve a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute. Yet, as Justice Brennan explained in Perez, one of the
most important factors prompting the invention of declaratory judgments was the
desire to limit the impact of federal-court adjudications on the enforcement of state
statutes, particularly in the area of criminal law. See Perez, 401 U.S. at 111-13
(Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
There were other legislative responses to federal court injunctions against
enforcement of state law. For example, in 1937 Congress passed the Tax Injunction
Act to limit the power of federal courts to restrain the collection of state taxes. See 28
U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) ("The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.") Around the same time,
Congress required the creation of special three-judge courts to decide cases in which
a party sought to enjoin the operation of a state statute on constitutional grounds.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
3
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
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important for present purposes, declaratory judgments are intended
to be a flexible alternative to injunctive relief, to the extent that they
do not tie the hands of government officials in day-to-day law
enforcement and administration.
Before the invention of declaratory judgments, a party
challenging a statute before it had been applied would ask a court to
enjoin the statute's enforcement. For example, a business contesting
the validity of a tax provision would ask a court to prevent a state
government from collecting taxes pursuant to that law. This was a
very intrusive remedy because it completely foreclosed the state from
enforcing its law. Courts were understandably reluctant to interfere
so greatly in the everyday administration of government, especially if
they thought that a law might be susceptible of some constitutional
applications. Because of the courts' excessive caution, many parties
challenging the validity of laws were sent out of court empty-handed.
The availability of declaratory judgments remedied this
situation. Now, when a court decides that a law is unconstitutional, a
declaratory judgment clarifies the state of the law while leaving room
for the government to maneuver. For example, consider a state law
that criminalizes distribution of handbills without a governmentissued license. If a federal court issues a declaratory judgment saying
that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore violates
freedom of speech, the court does not forbid state officials from
enforcing the law. Instead, the declaratory judgment simply puts
those officials on notice that the federal court stands ready to
overturn any convictions under that law. If the state legislature
amends the law, or if state courts later put a narrowing construction
on the statute that eliminates the overbreadth problem, for example,
by making issuance of a license mandatory upon satisfaction of
neutral time, place, and manner criteria, then the declaratory
judgment leaves prosecutors free to enforce the statute within the
new bounds without risking a citation for disobedience of a court
In this way, declaratory judgments interfere less with
order.'3
administration of the law and leave open the possibility of salvaging
constitutionally questionable laws.

1
See Perez, 401 U.S. at 93, 104-31 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing origins and rationale of Declaratory Judgment Act);
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469-71 (1974) (endorsing Justice Brennan's Perez
analysis).
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2. Equitable Discretion to Delay or Withhold Relief
In the Anglo-American legal tradition, courts enjoy broad
discretion to grant, withhold, or delay the issuance of coercive relief.
One reason for this broad discretion is that the power to issue
injunctions - that is, mandatory orders forbidding a party from
taking a particular action - traces its origins to the flexible authority
of the English Chancellor to resolve disputes in accordance with
broad notions of fairness when other courts offered no relief. Unlike
the strictly defined actions for monetary damages in common-law
courts, "[t] he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities
of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it.'

35

Because equitable remedies are extraordinary

measures, courts have enjoyed discretion to withhold injunctive relief
when circumstances 36warrant. An injunction "is not a remedy which
issues as of course.'

Modern American courts have inherited their predecessors'
discretion to withhold or delay coercive relief. This power is not
codified in any statute, but is instead grounded in centuries ofjudgemade common law.
The United States Supreme Court has
consistently reaffirmed that, absent a clear statutory limitation,
federal courts retain their full range of discretion to grant or
withhold equitable relief, or to stay the effect of a judgment for a
certain time. 37 This sets American courts quite apart from the Italian
135Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 331 (1944) (holding that district
court
need not automatically issue injunctive relief upon showing that price-control statute
was violated).
1
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The common-law courts had discretion in more limited
circumstances, also involving coercive relief. For example, when asked to issue a writ
of mandamus ordering a lower court or a government official to perform an
obligatory function, a common-law court had to consider all the circumstances
before awarding such extraordinary relief. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 572 (1985).
137 See Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (holding that a
price-control statute does not remove the district court's equitable power to order

restitution, absent an explicit congressional command to the contrary).
Courts enjoy similar, although slightly more limited discretion to withhold

declaratory relief. Federal law states that federal courts "may" declare the rights of
interested parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300 (1943) ("The DeclaratoryJudgments Act was not devised

to deprive courts of their equity powers or of their freedom to withhold relief upon
established equitable principles. It only provided a new form of procedure for the
adjudication of rights in conformity to those principles."). As the United States
Supreme Court has said, "[t]he propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may
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Constitutional Court, whose decisions must take effect the day after
their publication.ss
In considering whether to grant equitable relief, it is well
established that American courts should take into account not only
the interests of the parties to the litigation, but also broader public
interests. 9 This principle finds its most forceful expression in the
doctrines governing when federal courts should abstain from
exercising their jurisdiction over a case in favor of letting state courts
resolve it.

In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 40 for

example, the United States Supreme Court held that, in an action for
equitable relief, a federal court should abstain from acting if a state
court's resolution of a state-law issue would permit the court to avoid
ruling on a constitutional question. Two public interests converged:
the desirability of avoiding "needless friction" between state and
federal courts, and the need for federal courts to avoid prematurely
adjudicating constitutional questions. The Court explained that
" [t] he history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of the
injunction. '4 ' Similar considerations preclude federal courts from
depend upon equitable considerations, and is also informed by the teachings and
experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power." Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72 (1985). In general, similar considerations guide a judge's
decision to issue injunctive or declaratory relief. The main distinction is that a
plaintiff seeking declaratory relief need not demonstrate that he will suffer
irregarable harm absent such an order.
See CosT. art. 136. As discussed earlier, the framers of the Italian Constitution
expressly rejected the Austrian model, which allows the constitutional tribunal to
postpone the efficacy of its judgments up to one year. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
139 See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 319 U.S. at 297-98. The
Court stated:
[A] federal court of equity, which may in an appropriate case
refuse to give its special protection to private rights when the
exercise of its jurisdiction would be prejudicial to the public
interest, should stay its hand in the public interest when it
reasonably appears that private interests will not suffer.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289
U.S. 352, 360-61 (1933). The Dern Court noted:
The Court, in its discretion, may refuse mandamus to compel the
doing of an idle act, or to give a remedy which would work a public
injury or embarrassment just as, in its sound discretion, a court of
equity may refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the exercise of
which may be prejudicial to the public interest.
Id.
140 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
141 Id. at 500.
The abstention mechanism created by the Court in Pullman has
been largely superseded by a statute that authorizes federal courts to certify to state
supreme courts important questions regarding the interpretation of state law. The
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enjoining ongoing criminal proceedings1 4 or entertaining lawsuits
that would unduly interfere with the workings of complex state
regulatory schemes.'

Arguably, a court should accord even greater weight to the
public cost or benefit of granting special relief when the litigation
involves a law having a broad social impact, affecting more than the
rights of the individual litigants. For example, in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.,'" the Supreme Court had to decide whether a wartime
price-control statute authorized a court to order restitution of
overcharges to customers - a remedy that was traditionally available
only from courts of equity. The Court held that restitution was
available, in part because such a remedy would further the general
anti-inflationary purpose of the law. As the Court explained, "since
the public interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature, those
equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible4
character than when only a private controversy is at stake."' 5
Likewise, in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, the
Court declined to award the "equitable" remedy of back pay to
women who had been required to overcontribute to their employers'
pension plans in violation of federal antidiscrimination law, on the
grounds that such relief could throw pension systems around the
country into disarray.147 Here and elsewhere, the Supreme Court has
continually emphasized that the source of the courts' ability to take
into account such broad considerations of public interest lies in their
historical power and duty to exercise
discretion when awarding
48
extraordinary forms ofjudicial relief'
federal tribunal will generally suspend its proceedings while awaiting a response
from the state court. The Supreme Court recently spoke encouragingly about the
utility of certifying questions to state courts. See Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997).
4
4

14
14
14
147

SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).

See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943).
328 U.S. 395 (1946).

Id. at 398.
435 U.S. 702 (1978).

See id. at 721 (stating that "[d]rastic changes in the legal rules governing

pension and insurance funds" might "jeopardiz[e] the insurer's solvency and,
ultimately, the insureds' benefits"). Strictly speaking, the Court opted not to give its
decision retroactive effect, meaning that overcontributions made before its decision
would not give rise to a right to back pay.
14

See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) ("The authority

of a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in
which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief. .. ."); New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (finding roots of abstention
doctrines in "federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types
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3. Follow-up
Unlike the Italian Constitutional Court, which answers an
abstract question about the constitutionality of a law and then lets an
ordinary court determine how to resolve a case concretely, an
American court both rules on the constitutionality of a law and
formulates concrete relief. As a practical matter, that means that an
American court can take steps to ensure compliance with its
judgment simply by retaining jurisdiction over a case.1 The federal
Declaratory Judgment Act specifically provides for the possibility of
injunctive or other coercive relief following upon the heels of a
declaratory judgment.'o
An example of how this can work in practice is furnished by
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.'5 1 In Weinberger, a federal court held that
the Navy was violating a water-pollution law by dropping bombs into
the ocean without a special permit from the Environmental
Protection Agency. Rather than enjoin the Navy's bombing runs
immediately, the Supreme Court exercised its equitable discretion to
give the Navy time to applyfor the permit.'52 The Supreme Court did
not foreclose the possibility that it would eventually issue injunctive
relief: "Should it become clear that no permit will be issued and that
compliance with the [water-pollution law] will not be forthcoming,
the statutory scheme and purpose would require the court to
reconsider the balance it has struck."' 3 To monitor this progress, the
lower court retained jurisdiction over the case.
A similar procedure was followed in Pullman. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that a federal court should abstain from
deciding a constitutional question that might be avoided by
of relief - a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which
the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted").
It is standard practice for United States federal courts to retain jurisdiction
149

over cases to monitor compliance with their judgments. The Supreme Court itself
has set the example. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 588 (1993)

(discussing final judgment whereby Supreme Court retained jurisdiction over a case
so that any party could petition to amend the judgment for reason of "[a] ny change

in conditions making modification of the decree or the granting of further relief
necessary or appropriate"); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-92 (1992) (discussing
district court's retention of jurisdiction to supervise local school board's compliance

with racial desegregation order).
MoSee 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1994).
1
456 U.S. 305 (1982).
152

See id. at 319 ("'The exercise of equitable discretion, which must include the

ability to deny as well as grant injunctive relief, can fully protect the range of public
interests at issue at this stage in the proceedings.").
153

Id.
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interpretation of a state law, in favor of letting the parties seek
adjudication of the state-law issue in state courts. If the parties did
not promptly seek such a state-court adjudication, however, the
federal court would be obliged to rule on the controversy. To guard
against this possibility, the Supreme Court noted, the district court
ought to retain jurisdiction.'By retaining jurisdiction over a case in which it has issued
declaratory relief, a court can later issue a more definitive order that
avoids each of the problems attached to Italian practice. First, the
court can ensure individual justice and preserve litigants' incentives
to pursue constitutional claims by guaranteeing that the parties are
not ultimately subjected to the unconstitutional law. If the legislature
does not solve the problem, the court will.
Furthermore, the court can announce in advance when it will
revisit the issue of relief if no reform is enacted by the political
branches - in effect, the court can set a deadline for legislative
action. This authority to set deadlines derives from the inherent
power of common-law courts to control the enforcement of their
decrees. Moreover, because American courts are not bound by any
limit like Article 136 of the Italian Constitution, there is no
requirement that their judgments take effect immediately. Indeed, it
is common practice for American courts to stay the effect of their
judgments for a fixed period of time. Faced with a credible deadline
for action, the legislature is more likely to react promptly than if it is
convinced that the court is committed to indefinite delays.
In sum, these three powers - to issue a declaratory judgment, to
delay coercive relief, and to retain jurisdiction over a case to monitor
compliance with a judgment - provide American courts with the
tools needed to introduce a delay between announcing that a law is
unconstitutional and prohibiting it from having effect. These powers
See Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
Indeed, this process of retainingjurisdiction not only enables a lower federal court to
monitor compliance with its decrees, but also commonly affords the Supreme Court
a chance to control how its rulings are applied by lower courts. Every time a final
order is entered, a party has the chance to appeal that order all the way up to the
Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court can accept a petition for
certiorari to review a declaratory judgment rendered in a lower court. Subsequently,
if the lower court grants or denies injunctive relief, another appeal can be taken. For
an example of a case that returned repeatedly to the United States Supreme Court
on questions regarding judicial remedies, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 73
(1995) (ruling on breadth of lower court's remedial order); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33, 37 (1990) (ruling on propriety of lower court's ordering tax increase to fund
school desegregation program); Missouri v.Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 275 (1989) (ruling
on award of attorneys' fees to civil rights plaintiffs).
154
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also give those courts the ability to avoid the twin flaws visible in the
decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court.
B. Circumstances in Which Delay May Be Desirable
In the usual case, there is no reason for American courts to
hesitate before enjoining an unconstitutional law. Many of the
factors prompting the development of this approach in Italy are not
as pressing in the United States. American courts can interpret both
the Constitution and statutes, enabling them to avoid constitutional
adjudication more easily than can the Italian Constitutional Court,
which must defer to the statutory interpretations of the Court of
Cassation. Perhaps more importantly, American courts are less likely
than the Italian Court to find complex social welfare laws
unconstitutional. Unless suspect or quasi-suspect classifications such
as race or gender are involved, United States courts will uphold social
welfare legislation against an equal protection challenge as long as
the legislation has some rational basis. 55 This standard is far more
deferential than the Italian "reasonableness" standard. Furthermore,
the United States Constitution has been interpreted more as a
limitation on the government's intrusion into the private sphere
rather than as a source of affirmative government duties as in Italy.
In the usual case in which a court strikes down a law for impinging on
individual liberty, the resultant "gap" does not impair any other
constitutional value.
In run-of-the-mill constitutional cases,
therefore, American courts will find less need to delay adjudication so
that the legislative branches can intervene.
The Italian experience, however, indicates that it may be useful
to introduce a delay between declaratory and injunctive relief in two
sets of circumstances: (1) when striking down a law would disrupt or
defeat the pursuit of important public interests in the administration
of the law, and (2) when formulating creative relief would test the
limits ofjudicial competence. This is particularly true when the main
issues revolve around the allocation of public funds, a task best
entrusted to the legislature. The following analysis of United States
Supreme Court decisions suggests that American law values
155

See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The Court stated:

In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is
not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in
some inequality."
Id. (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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deference to the legislature in these areas. In extraordinary cases,
therefore, American courts may find it advisable to delay the issuance
of coercive relief to give the legislature a first crack at reforming a
defective law.
1. Avoiding Disruption of Government Administration
Two cases illustrate how the Supreme Court, in order to avoid
major disruption of the nationwide administration of law, has delayed
issuing injunctive relief to buy time for the political branches to
reform an unconstitutional law. In the first, Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 56 the Supreme Court

declared unconstitutional the newly established United States
bankruptcy court system on the ground that it conferred judicial
power on judges who did not enjoy life tenure or salary
independence.'5 7 This system, the Court held, violated Article III of
the Constitution. By the time the Supreme Court issued its ruling in
1982, however, the new system had already been in effect for almost
six years. Thousands of bankruptcy proceedings were pending
throughout the country. For the Supreme Court to have enjoined
further proceedings in the case before it would have meant that all
other courts throughout the United States would have had to follow
suit.
Not only would this have paralyzed all liquidation and
reorganization proceedings, but it also would have triggered an
avalanche of litigation in the federal district courts.
To avoid these dire consequences, the Supreme Court stayed its
judgment for three months. In its own words, such a "limited stay will
afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts
or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the
interim administration of the bankruptcy laws."'-" The Court later
extended this deadline to December 24, 1982 '15 but refused to
postpone it any further.' 6 As the expiration of the stay approached, it
became clear that Congress would not soon reconstitute the
bankruptcy courts. To avoid disruptions in bankruptcy proceedings,
federal district courts throughout the country adopted a stopgap

458 U.S. 50 (1982).
See id. at 87.
158 Id. at
89.
159 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 459 U.S. 813, 813
(1982).
160 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094,
1094 (1982).
15

157
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local rule, proposed by the United States Judicial Conference.16 ' This
rule authorized district courts to refer core bankruptcy matters to
non-Article III bankruptcy judges while retaining all other collateral
matters. With a temporary system in place that seemed to comply
with Northern Pipeline,6 1 Congress did not feel compelled to intervene
until mid-1984.'o
In Buckley v. Valeo,"' the Supreme Court invalidated several
aspects of the federal campaign finance laws, including the
establishment of the Federal Election Commission.' 65 Because some
members of the Commission were appointed by congressional
officers, the Court ruled that the Commission could not exercise its
enforcement or rulemaking powers without violating the
constitutional requirement that all "Officers of the United States" be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.' 6 Like the bankruptcy courts several years before, however,
the Federal Election Commission already had been operating for
some time. Indeed, the Commission was in the midst of rulemaking
procedures. As in Northern Pipeline, the Court stayed its injunction to
ensure the uninterrupted enforcement of the electoral laws that it
had upheld, as well as to give Congress some breathing space to
reform the appointment process. For these reasons, the Court stayed
its judgment for up to 30 days
insofar as it affects the authority of the Commission to exercise
the duties and powers granted it under the Act. This limited stay
will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the
Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement
mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions
the Court sustains, allowing the present Commission in the

See Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 5, 38-39 (1995); Walter J. Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court
System, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 236-37 (1985).
162 See Taggart, supra note 161, at 236 & n.27 (noting that every court of appeals
that considered the validity of the emergency rules upheld them).
163 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333 (enacted July 10, 1984). Even then, impetus to amend the
Bankruptcy Code came mainly in response to a later decision of the Supreme Court,
which held that a Chapter 11 debtor could reject a collective-bargaining agreement.
See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); see also Tabb, supra note 161, at
38-39.
164 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
165
See id. at 143.
166 Id. at 138-39 (noting that minor officers
may constitutionally be appointed by
the President alone, the courts, or the heads of departments).
161
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interim to function de facto in accordance with the substantive
provisions of the Act.167

This initial stay lasted until February 29, 1976, and was later extended
to March 22, 1976.'6 Fifty days after the stay expired, the President
signed a new law providing for revised appointment procedures.'6
Although the political branches had not managed to comply with the
Court's deadline, their action seems speedy by legislative yardsticks,
and was undoubtedly spurred in part by the elimination of the
Commission's authority.
In showing special solicitude to leave the legislature a chance to
reform the law before an injunction interrupted the normal
functioning of the electoral system, Buckley harkened back to the
Supreme Court's voting rights and electoral reapportionment cases.
One case that the Court cited was Maryland Committee for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 70 in which the Court held that the
apportionment of the Maryland State Legislature was not consistent
After concluding its
with the one-person, one-vote principle. 7 '
constitutional analysis, the Court sent the case back to the state court
for further proceedings with the following instructions:
Since primary responsibility for legislative apportionment rests
with the legislature itself and since adequate time [two years]
exists in which the Maryland General Assembly can act, the
Maryland courts need feel obliged to take further affirmative
action only if the legislature fails to enact a constitutionally valid
state legislative apportionment scheme in a timely fashion after
being afforded a further opportunity by the courts to do so.
However, under no circumstances should the [next] election of
members of the Maryland Legislature be permitted to be
conducted pursuant to the existing or any other unconstitutional
plan. 17'

Although the Supreme Court's guidance was not binding on the state
court, it nevertheless demonstrates that the Supreme Court highly
values legislative freedom of action. Courts should try not to step in
immediately, if a little time will let legislatures resolve political issues
on their own and delay will notjeopardize constitutional rights.
167

Id. at 143.

16

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 936, 936 (1976).

169

See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, §

101(3), 90 Stat. 475, 476 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1988))
1976).
170 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
171
172

See id. at 674.
Id. at 676.

(enacted May 11,

1999]

ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

It is interesting to observe that the political branches produced
an amended law more quickly after Buckley than after Northern
Pipeline.
In the aftermath of Buckley, the Federal Election
Commission's authority had lapsed, so there was greater urgency for
legislative reform. Although Congress did not manage to pass a new
law governing appointment of election commissioners before the
Supreme Court's stay had expired, it did pass a new law shortly
thereafter. The situation after Northern Pipeline was quite different.
When it became clear that the lower federal courts could temporarily
hold the bankruptcy system together by local rule, congressional
response time was much slower. The new bankruptcy amendments
came more than eighteen months after the Supreme Court's stay had
expired.
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court had the same instincts
as the Italian Constitutional Court in the public tax hearings case.
On the American side, the Supreme Court wanted to avoid
"interrupting enforcement" of valid bankruptcy and election-finance
laws. In Italy, the Constitutional Court wanted to avoid disrupting all
pending proceedings against tax evaders. Each court announced that
the law was invalid, yet delayed the effect of its judgment precisely so
that the legislative branch could reform the law.
While the Supreme Court is generally receptive to the strategy of
staying injunctive or declaratory relief to give legislatures time to
amend laws, it has demanded that judicial orders doing so be
sufficiently detailed. In this way, government officials are put on
notice as to exactly how they ought to comply with a court's ruling,
or, if they disagree, how to seek prompt appellate review. These
points are illustrated by University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam
7
v. Gunn1
1 in which a three-judge district court held unconstitutional
a Texas disturbing-the-peace statute. The panel refrained from
entering a formal judgment and ended its opinion in this way:
We reach the conclusion that Article 474 is impermissibly and
unconstitutionally broad. The Plaintiffs herein are entitled to
their declaratory judgment to that effect, and to injunctive relief
against the enforcement of [the Texas statute] ....

However, it is

the Order of this Court that the mandate shall be stayed and this
Court shall retain jurisdiction of the cause pending the next
session, special or general, of the Texas legislature, at which time
the State of Texas may, if it so desires, enact such disturbing-the7 4
peace statute as will meet constitutional requirements.

:7

'7:

289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 383 (1970).
Id. at 475.
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The Texas legislature adjourned without amending the law, the lower
court never issued a more definite order, and the State appealed the
decision directly to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on technical grounds
because at the time it only had jurisdiction to review a decision of a
lower court that granted or denied an injunction. The decision
below did neither and was merely an advisory opinion so vague that
"it is simply not possible to know with any certainty what the court has
decided.' 75 The Court gently criticized the lower court for failing to
be more specific in its original opinion or to issue a subsequent order
when the Texas legislature failed to act:
The restraint and tact that evidently motivated the District Court
in refraining from the entry of an injunctive order in this case are
understandable. But when a three-judge district court issues an
opinion expressing the view that a state statute should be
enjoined as unconstitutional - and then fails to follow up with an
injunction - the result is unfortunate at best. For when
confronted with such an opinion by a federal court, state officials
would no doubt hesitate long before disregarding it. Yet in the
absence of an injunctive order, they are unable to know precisely
what the three-judge court intended to enjoin, and unable as well
to appeal to this Court. 76
A declaration of unconstitutionality must be reasonably clear and
detailed so that the political branches can adequately respond or, if
the order comes from a lower court, appeal to a higher judicial
authority.
2. Letting the Political Branches Balance Spending
Priorities
When litigants challenge government spending priorities, the
Supreme Court has often been sensitive to the necessity of leaving
delicate questions of political balancing to legislatures. This has been
especially true in areas involving social and economic rights, as well as
in cases challenging the equal distribution of government benefits.
In both types of cases, in which parties seek to reallocate limited
government resources, American courts have been reluctant to

175

Gunn v. University Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 388

(1970). It is worth noting that in most circumstances today, a federal district court
order declaring a law unconstitutional would be immediately reviewable by a federal
court of appeals, regardless of whether injunctive relief also was involved. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (authorizing appellate review over all final judgments).
176 Gunn, 399 U.S.
at 390-91.
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second-guess the legislative branches. 7 7
After finding that a
government has violated a constitutional command, courts
commonly issue broadly worded injunctions that leave space for the
government to determine how it will comply with the court's order.
Although courts may ultimately have to intervene quite decisively,
they generally do so only after the government fails to devise a
satisfactory solution on its own. 78
Take social and economic rights first. The United States
Constitution protects mainly what are often called "negative" rights,
that is, rights to be free from government interference. Most of the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights fall within this category:
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and so on. The Supreme Court repeatedly has
turned away claims that the United States Constitution guarantees
certain "affirmative" rights that would require the government to
provide services to individuals, such as education '7 or a subsistence
income."*
In this respect, the American charter differs
fundamentally from the Italian."' Yet, there are many examples of
American constitutional guarantees that can be characterized as
affirmative rights, to the extent that the government must pay for
certain services as a condition of taking certain action. 82 Two
177 See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47, 54 (1977) (upholding statute that
terminates dependent child's eligibility for Social Security benefits upon his
marriage); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (upholding state regulation that
funded abortions only if "medically necessary," after making the deferential inquiry
as to whether the regulation was rationally related to a constitutionally permissible
purpose).
I The Supreme Court has forcefully reiterated its warning that federal courts
should be wary of issuing detailed "structural injunctions" that virtually take over the
management of state agencies without detailed showings that the agencies failed to
satisfy constitutional requirements. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 390-93 (1996)
(reversing a trial court's wide-ranging attempt to reform the Arizona prison system);
see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (explaining that judges must defer to
the judgment of prison administrators not only because of their greater expertise,
"but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the
province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the
Judicial").
7
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected.").
ISOSee Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (rejecting challenge
to
unequal distribution of welfare benefits because it did not implicate any "freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights"); see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74
(1972) (recognizing that there is no federal constitutional right to housing).
8s See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.
182 There is no bright line distinguishing between affirmative and negative rights,
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examples that immediately come to mind are the rights of prisoners
and patients involuntarily committed to government psychiatric
institutions. In neither case does the United States Constitution
require the state to confine anyone; but once the state decides to do
so, it must treat confinees according to certain minimal standards. In
the prisoners' case, the state must not let conditions deteriorate to
the level of "cruel and unusual punishment;" 83 in the patients' case,
the state must ensure that individuals are offered adequate food,
shelter, and clothing, as well as basic rehabilitation services.'"
While the Supreme Court is prepared to decide whether the
government is satisfying constitutional standards in treating inmates
and patients, it is hesitant about substituting judicial judgment for
that of the political branches, particularly when a case turns on the
reallocation of scarce government resources. For example, the
Supreme Court has reiterated that, upon finding unconstitutional
conditions in a prison system, a court should give prison officials the
first chance to propose a remedial program. 5 Judges must limit
themselves from overly interfering with the judgment of the
legislative and executive branches.
The same is true in cases involving challenges to the equal
distribution of government resources. Here, education stands out as
an area in which conflict has been carried out largely in the judicial
arena. The federal courts have most often become involved when
parties claim that educational opportunities are skewed against racial
minorities. Upon a finding of racial discrimination, the courts are
not immediately to draw up their own plans for eliminating racial
disparities. Instead, the primary responsibility for drafting solutions
is left to local school boards, with judges ensuring that those plans are

of course. For example, the right of a poor criminal defendant to have a free lawyer
can be conceived either way. It is a negative right if formulated as the right to be free
from prosecution without free legal advice. Or it is an affirmative right if viewed as a
government obligation to provide a lawyer to criminal defendants.
183 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
184 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding
that involuntarily
committed mental patients have a right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical
care, safe living conditions, and freedom from undue bodily restraint); Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir. 1984)
(adding that patients have a right to training sufficient to preserve basic life skills).
185 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362-63 (praising the procedure followed
in Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), in which the district court charged state prison officials

with the task of devising a prison reform plan, and then adopted a modified version
of that plan after considering objections by inmates); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 492 (1973) (requiring federal courts to give state prison officials "the first
opportunity to correct errors made in the internal administration of their prisons").
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Even when the
adequate to resolve constitutional deficiencies.
courts have gone as far as to require the government to increase
spending to remedy a constitutional violation, the courts must let the
government determine (in the first instance) precisely how that
money is to be raised.'"" Only as a last resort, if the government fails
to offer a satisfactory plan, or fails to live up to its promises, is a court
justified in substituting its own remedial judgment for that of the
political branches.
C. Applying the ItalianLessons to a Balanced Budget Amendment
American precedent suggests that United States courts have the
technical ability, as well as some of the same motivations as the Italian
Constitutional Court, to build in a delay between the issuance of
declaratory and injunctive relief. This technique is useful in
extraordinary cases in which standard forms of judicial relief are
inadequate to deal with an unconstitutional law, but a timely
legislative response could eliminate the problem. To illustrate how
concerns of public administration, the setting of government
spending priorities, and the preservation of legislative discretion
could all come together to make judicial temporizing appropriate,
consider how a court would be forced to deal with a proposed
Balanced Budget Amendment to the United States Constitution.
For a number of years, Congress has considered proposals to
amend the Constitution to require the federal government to adopt a
balanced budget. There have been numerous formulations of this
amendment, but almost all of them would institute a requirement
that "[t]otal outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts
for that fiscal year" absent a supermajority vote in Congress.'8 The
186 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 52 ("By no means should a district court
grant local
government carte blanche, but local officials should at least have the opportunity to
devise their own solutions to these problems.") (citation omitted); cf Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 614-15 & n.77 (1983) (discussing how the
Supreme Court, when authorizing a delay in the implementation of desegregation in
Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), drew on prior cases authorizing
delay in parties' compliance with complex remedial decrees; discussing whether
Supreme Court properly allowed desegregation to take place "with all deliberate
speed").
187 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-52 (1990) (approving district court's
authority to order local school district to raise taxes to meet expenses of school
desegregation plan, but ruling that court should have allowed school district to
determine how it would obtain that tax revenue).
188 Representative of the proposals is H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(as amended, see 141 Cong. Rec. S3231, 3240 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995) (introducing
final language of section 6); 141 Cong. Rec. S3251, 3251 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995)
(adopting final language)), which failed in the United States Senate by a vote of 64
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political impetus behind the amendment has recently faded
somewhat as the American economy continues to grow, and surging
federal revenue has allowed political leaders to eliminate the annual
federal budget deficit for the first time in thirty years.'9 Some
supporters, however, still believe that budgetary discipline is best
written into the Constitution, as protection against the day when the
economy takes a downturn and Congress is again tempted to spend
on credit.
The goal of this Article is not to argue about the political wisdom
of a Balanced Budget Amendment, nor about whether courts are the

to 35. See 142 Cong. Rec. S5873, S5903 (daily ed. June 6, 1996). The text of the
proposed amendment read:
SECTION 1. Total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total
receipts for that fiscal year, unless three-fifths of the whole number of
each House of Congress shall provide by law for a specific excess of
outlays over receipts by a rollcall vote.
SECTION 2. The limit on the debt of the United States held by the
public shall not be increased, unless three-fifths of the whole number
of each House shall provide by law for such an increase by a rollcall
vote.
SECTION 3. Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall transmit to
the Congress a proposed budget for the United States Government for
that fiscal year, in which total outlays do not exceed total receipts.
SECTION 4. No bill to increase revenue shall become law unless
approved by a majority of the whole number of each House by a
rollcall vote.
SECTION 5. The Congress may waive the provisions of this article
for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect. The
provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal year in which the
United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent
and serious military threat to national security and is so declared by a
joint resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each
House, which becomes law.
SECTION 6. The Congress shall enforce and implement this article
by appropriate legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and
receipts. The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to
any case or controversy arising under this Article except as may be
specifically authorized by legislation adopted pursuant to this section.
SECTION 7. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United
States Government except those derived from borrowing. Total outlays
shall include all outlays of the United States Government except for
those for repayment of debt principal.
SECTION 8. This article shall take effect beginning with fiscal year
2002 or with the second fiscal year beginning after its ratification,
whichever is later.
H.R.J. Res. 1.

18
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1999 (projecting balanced
budget for 1999); THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, at 108 (1998)

(summarizing United States federal budget deficits and surpluses).
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best-suited organs to enforce it. Instead, the sole aim is to use the
amendment as an illustrative tool. A case involving the amendment
would present just the sort of awkward circumstances in which
American courts might find inadequate their usual array of judicial
tools, and in which it might prove useful to introduce a delay between
declaratory and coercive relief. For purposes of this discussion,
therefore, this Article puts aside as extraneous other important issues
that would probably dog any adjudication of such an amendment,
such as standing and justiciability.' 90
If called upon to enforce a balanced budget amendment, the
Supreme Court could tread the same path as the Italian
Constitutional Court when that body deals with complex challenges

The most commonly mentioned candidates for standing are taxpayers and
members of Congress, both of whom would have to surmount serious obstacles to
justify their right to sue. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) (holding that
taxpayers had standing to challenge federal spending under the Establishment
Clause because that provision is a "specific constitutional limitation imposed upon
the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power"); Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 826 (1997) (rejecting legislators' standing to challenge Line Item Veto
Act); see also Gay Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the
Balanced Budget Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1077-82 (1983) (discussing
problems inherent in taxpayer standing).
As forjusticiability, one might question judicial competence to second-guess the
political branches' application of general terms used in the proposed amendments
such as "revenue" and "outlay." See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced
Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (andNo More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449,
1479-84 (1997) (criticizing recent drafts of the amendment for seemingly adopting
the cash method of accounting, and thereby leaving open innumerable ways for
Congress to restructure federal expenditures and borrowing to evade the letter of
the amendment). Yet state supreme courts have dealt with similar interpretive issues
in connection with state balanced budget requirements. See generally Donald B.
Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State
Experiences, 12J. L. & POL. 153 (1996).
Finally, there is the possibility that the amendment itself might explicitly forbid
courts from hearing disputes over the federal budget. In one recent draft, the courts
would have no authority to implement the new constitutional provision unless
Congress enacted legislation to that effect. See H.R.J. Res. 1, § 6, supra note 188. A
1993 version of the amendment, which also narrowly failed passage, would have
limited courts to issuing declaratory relief unless Congress provided for further
remedies: "The power of any court to order relief pursuant to any case or
controversy arising under this article shall not extend to ordering any remedies other
than a declaratory judgment or such remedies as are specifically authorized in
implementing legislation pursuant to this section." SJ. Res. 41, § 6, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993), 140 Cong. Rec. S1824 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994). Senator Danforth of
Missouri proposed this language to ensure that federal courts could not raise taxes to
bring the budget into balance. This modification came in response to the Supreme
Court's then-recent decision in Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), in which the
Court held that federal courts could order local governments to levy taxes to comply
with a federal judgment.
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to social and economic rights. The postponing of injunctive relief
might be a logical response so that Congress could pass an amended
budget without requiring the Supreme Court to take more drastic
action. As elsewhere, the Court's decision could follow the pattern of
denounce-decline-demand.
Upon determining that a budget is unbalanced, the Court would
find itself faced with two remedial options, neither of which is
particularly attractive. First, the Court could try to balance the
budget itself. Yet, there seem to be no legal standards for doing so.
For one thing, the Court would have no legal basis for choosing
between raising taxes or cutting spending. 91 None of the vetted
balanced budget amendments provide for either solution; either
would be perfectly acceptable if undertaken by Congress, as far as the
balanced budget amendment is concerned. Furthermore, the Court
would have no judicially manageable standards for determining how
to allocate spending cuts among the manifold federal expenditure
programs, or to distribute revenue increases among the various
federal taxes. For the Court to pick and choose among programs
obviously would involve the judiciary in judgments that are wholly
political, that is, informed entirely by values extraneous to the legal
system. Such judicial intrusion into the realm of legislative spending
authority would violate separation-of-powers principles. The United
States Supreme Court would find itself much in the same position as
the Italian Constitutional Court when it finds the avenue of an
additive judgment foreclosed due to the excess of discretionary
decision making involved.
Second, the Supreme Court could enjoin all spending under the
budget, on the theory that it is wholly invalid because it was enacted
in violation of the amendment. This sort of relief would not, it
seems, engage the Court in the sort of political value judgments that
would trespass on the competencies of other branches of
government. Hence, there would'be no justiciability bar to such a
Such a decision, however, would have extraordinary
remedy.
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Some have read the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.

33 (1990), as a warning that the Court could raise taxes to close a budget deficit. See
supra note 187. Yet this worry seems misplaced. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court
determined that a local school district had discriminated against black children and
held that the State was constitutionally required to increase spending to relieve the
effects of past discrimination. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 57-58. The State had an
Thus, because spending
affirmative duty to provide educational services.
constitutionally had to be increased, taxing had to follow. A balanced budget
amendment, however, has no similar bias towards greater or lesser expenditures. All
it requires is that outlays be in synch with revenues.
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consequences for the public, and, as pointed out earlier, the Court
must take into account the public interest when deciding whether to
grant injunctive relief.192
A decision freezing all federal
disbursements could have catastrophic effects. Millions of Americans
rely on monthly Social Security checks to survive. Millions of others
are employed by the government, and depend just as surely on their
paychecks. Enjoining all federal expenditures would greatly disrupt
life in the United States. These are equitable issues worthy of
consideration.'"

One also could imagine constitutional issues being at stake. For
example, the United States Constitution provides that a federal
judge's salary shall not be reduced during his tenure in office. If no
federal budget were approved, and judges' salaries were withheld,
would that result in a constitutional violation? On occasion in the
past, Congress has managed to pass short-term, stop-gap budgets to
keep essential government operations flowing while the overall
budget was still unresolved. Government shut-downs have caused
tremendous disruptions, and it is not clear whether a balanced
budget amendment would leave room for such interim solutions. It
would be difficult for the Supreme Court to conclude, after
considering the public interests at stake, what course of action to
take. 194

To put off this dilemma, the Supreme Court could try to
temporize. The Supreme Court could issue a declaratory judgment
and then announce that it was delaying relief, for a set amount of
time, for Congress to reach agreement on a new budget that
complied with the criteria set forth in the Court's judgment. This
sort of decision would be perfectly compatible with decisions like
Northern Pipeline and Buckley, in which the Court, to avoid the
inconveniences of shutting down parts of the government, postponed
the effect of its judgment to buy time for legislative reform.

See supra notes 135-47.
See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (dicta) (noting that, as a matter
of equitable discretion, "[i]n previous cases involving equal protection challenges to
underinclusive federal benefits statutes, this Court has suggested that extension,
rather than nullification, is the proper course" partly because "an injunction
suspending the program's operation would impose hardship on beneficiaries whom
Congress plainly meant to protect").
But see Crosthwait, supra note 190, at 1097-98 (assuming that an injunction
ordering the Treasury to withhold authorization for expenditures under an illegal
budget would result in the "full termination of federal spending," but hypothesizing
that the "loss of essential services" would spark political disobedience of the decree).
192
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For the Court's decision to have practical effect, that is, to truly
pressure Congress into enacting a proper budget, the Court would
have to be ready to back up its threats with deeds. One of the lessons
to learn from the Italian Constitutional Court is that if a court is not
prepared to follow up on a declaratory judgment with more incisive
action - invalidating the law in the Italian case, or enjoining it in the
American - then its decisions lose most of their bite. The United
States Supreme Court would do well to set a deadline up front,
putting Congress on notice that it had a limited amount of time to
pass a new budget. If that deadline passed unheeded, then more
definite relief would issue. If the Supreme Court were not prepared
to take such action, then it would do better to simply abstain from
adjudication in the first place, rather than call its credibility into
question as the Italian Court has done.
CONCLUSION

Since its founding after World War II, the Italian Corte
Costituzionalehas constantly searched for ways to move beyond a barebones model of negative legislation, in which it can either strike
down a law or do nothing. In remarkable testimony to the power of
judicial ingenuity, the Constitutional Court has developed a highly
nuanced range of judicial decision-making techniques within, the
formalistic bounds of these two seemingly rigid categories. The
Court has been extraordinarily "activist" in expanding into areas like
statutory interpretation, yet paradoxically this activism has been
largely designed to permit the Court to exercise the "passive virtue"
of abstaining from striking down laws on constitutional grounds.
This flexibility has not always proved sufficient, however, and the
Court has often faced unconstitutional laws that it finds itself unable
to strike down or fix. This has been especially true in cases in which
issuing standard forms of judicial relief would lead the Constitutional
Court to exceed the limited powers accorded to the judiciary by
making value judgments unguided by legal standards. In several
innovative decisions, the Court severed the link between declaring a
statute unconstitutional and rendering it inapplicable. In doing so,
the Court sought to establish a dialogue with the legislature,
sometimes begging, increasingly demanding. Unfortunately, the
Italian Parliament often has been unreceptive to judicial
imprecations. The Court contributes to the inefficacy of its own
threats because it does not always follow up on them. The Court
thereby reinforces the impression that Parliament is under no special
pressure to implement the Court's decisions.
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It is remarkable to realize that this power to delay or withhold
injunctive relief, toward which the Italian Court has moved over the
past forty years, is virtually taken for granted in the more flexible
American legal system. American courts, however, can draw some
useful lessons from the Italian practice. On a constructive note, the
Italian decisions demonstrate how courts can buy time for the
political branches to repair a defective law. While American courts
technically are capable of delaying relief, the Italian Constitutional
Court's experience highlights precisely how courts can more
systematically use these capabilities to shift some of the burden of
reform onto the shoulders of legislators.
Indeed, scattered
precedents like Northern Pipeline suggest that the United States
Supreme Court should be receptive to such efforts. Moreover, the
Italian experience suggests that it is most appropriate to leave room
for legislative reform when two factors come into play: when forceful
judicial action would disrupt the orderly working of government, or
when crafting remedial orders would push judges into areas of policymaking normally reserved for legislators (such as the allocation of
public resources).
The other lesson is more cautionary because the Italian
experience also shows that too much temporizing is a mistake.
American courts would do well to avoid vacillating as has the Italian
Constitutional Court, which rarely sets firm deadlines for the
legislature to act. If no response is forthcoming from the legislature
within a specified time, courts must be ready to follow up with
injunctive relief. To do otherwise would undercut the credibility of
the courts' threats and reduce the legislature's incentive to fix
unconstitutional laws. There must be limits to judicial self-restraint.

